03.16.07

Xiaofei Tian: Tao Yuanming & Manuscript Culture

Posted in 说书 at 4:27 am by 若水

这几日有空读了田晓菲老师的Tao Yuanming & Manuscript Culture: The Record of a Dusty Table (中文好像会翻成《尘几录——陶诗论稿》)。田老师在此著作中刻画了一个鲜为人知的陶潜：北宋以降，受东坡影响，大部分文人都将渊明看作一脱俗的隐士，并顺其意来解其诗。作者则指出六朝之时的中国文化界乃一“手稿文化”：在印刷术盛行之前，文本的流传往往经过了经过不同人之手，以不同的版本展现在我们面前。好比说，“采菊东篱下，悠然望南山”此二句就引出了后人强加的误解。苏轼提出，“悠然见南山”才是正确的版本，而“望”则是文本流传过程所致之失误：作为隐士的陶潜不会刻意去“望”南山，而只会不留意“见”南山。此观点被多数后人所采。但实际上这二句却可能有不同的意义。作者提出，在六朝时士人思想受老庄之道影响，好清谈玄学，隐居求仙：后人把“菊”认为是一种渊明隐居的比喻，而实际上当时菊花则与“长生不老”更有关联，为草药之一种。如果此观点的话，就不难理解“望”南山了。诗中可能并无那种刻意强调“隐士”的概念——此概念本身可能是后人强加的。作者更提出，陶潜传记并不肯定，无论是《晋书》、《南史》、《宋书》，还是萧统《文选》中渊明之传记，均有相似记载：“潜少怀高尚，博学，善属文，任真自得，为乡邻之所贵，尝著《五柳先生传》以自况，曰：‘先生不知何许人，不详姓字，宅有五柳树，因以为号焉。闲静少言， 不慕荣利。好读书，不求甚解，每有会意，欣然忘食。性嗜酒，而家贫不能恒得，亲旧知其如此，或置酒招之，造饮必尽，期在必醉，既醉而退，曾不吝情。环诸萧 然，不蔽风日，短褐穿结，箪瓢屡空，晏如也。常著文章自娱，颇示己志，忘怀得失，以此自终。”（《晋书·陶潜传》) 也就是说，对陶潜记载多出于其自传：而其自传则是一个名曰五柳先生的虚构人物之传记。陶潜作为“隐士”，也是由他一手打造的。作者则反问：如果陶谦真的是一隐士，为何要留下字据自谓“隐士”？好个“不祥姓字”！当然，作者也明白，“我们得记住这个‘少了些平静少了些不朽的陶渊明’也不能算是权威性版本。它只是很多个可能性中的一个，一个经常被刻意无视了的可能性而已。”作者希望通过陶渊明的例子来说明“多个”陶渊明存在的可能性，以突出中世纪中国的文献不稳定性以及其文献在不同注疏者笔下由于个人或意识形态需要改变而自成一体的现象。通过展现陶诗的不同版本以及东晋刘宋之交的文化以刻画一“手稿文化”，此作品不失为一佳作。

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03.14.07

Essay: Autonomy or Unity

Posted in 人文 at 8:53 pm by 若水

Autonomy or Unity—
An Analysis of the Relationships of Li, Creativity, and Heaven in Xunzi with a Brief Comparison to Those in Zhongyong

The School of Xunzi has long been considered heterodox in Chinese Confucian tradition, leaving both the text and its doctrines largely ignored for centuries. This paper shall examine the concepts of li, creativity, and Heaven in the text of Xunzi 荀子to demonstrate the separate and autonomous relationship among the three to illustrate a humanistic school of thought with a sociopolitical realistic aspiration for stability. It shall further compare these relationships to those of Zhongyong 中庸, a text to central the school of Zisi and Mencius, to illustrate a different approach taken by a philosophy that metaphysically unites all three through its defining concept of anthropocosmic unity, 天人合一.

The text of Xunzi closely ties the concept of li禮, translated into “propriety” and sometimes “ritual”, with the notion of learning. In the first chapter of the text, “Encouraging Learning”, Xunzi states that “learning begins with the recitation of the Classics and ends with the reading of the ritual [li 禮] texts; and as to objective, it beings with learning to be a man of breeding, and ends with learning to be a sage”.[1] This statement suggests that as far as the physical act of learning is concerned, the importance of a certain collection of texts that describe li is paramount, even more so than the recitation of Classics. Only after one fluently recites the Classics can he then understands li through reading these texts. In addition, the reading of these texts, i.e. the performance and understanding of li, in terms of its objective, is aligned with “learning to be a sage”. Xunzi, indeed, believes li to be “the great basis of law and the foundation of precedents”[2]. The purpose of li, then, sets a sociopolitical aspiration for learning; “basis of law” and “foundation of precedents” corresponds to legitimacy of politics and social norms, respectively. But at the same time, li fulfills an order that is manifest, but nonetheless beyond mere sociopolitical structures, as evident in the immediately following line from the previous statement: “therefore learning reaches its completion with the rituals, for they may be said to represent the highest point of the Way and its power”.[3] Li completes learning to represent Dao 道, the Confucian way, which encompasses the sociopolitical “basis of law” and “foundation of precedents”, but broadens to include human, natural, and cosmic order all together. As A.S. Cua notes, the concept of li formulates in three stages, first as an idea of rule in the sense of archaic religious rites, then as “a comprehensive notion embracing all social habits and customs acknowledged and accepted as a set of action-guiding rules”, with the third “connected with the notions of right (yi) and reason (li)” to accept as an exemplary rule of conduct for “any rule that is right and reasonable”.[4] Hence, li as sociopolitical ordering affixes to the second stage, while it as a symbol of Dao concerns with the third stage.

Xunzi further discusses li as a force that counters and contains man’s natural, base desires. These desires create tensions between men and generates disorder; to counter these disorder the ancient sage kings created li in order to curb these desires, viz. to allow the appropriate satisfaction to the desires in which neither desire exceeds the necessary condition for satisfaction nor the material good lacking to satisfy the said desire— this process explains the logical sequence from “man is born with desires” to “rites [li] are a means of satisfaction”.[5] Xunzi explains that the concept of li contains a conduct of life with the rightful desires appropriate to sociopolitical order, “therefore, if a man concentrates upon fulfilling ritual principles, then he may satisfy both his human desires and the demands of ritual; but if he concentrates only upon fulfilling his desires, then he will end by satisfying neither”.[6] From here it is evident that Xunzi’s concept of li contains an inner transformative force; the practice of li not only ensures that man fulfills the demand of li, that is, sociopolitical norms necessarily for stability, but also the satisfaction of human desires, as the practice of li standardizes the desire into a normative, balanced set of accepted needs. The transformative li, Xunzi states, has the following three foundations: “Heaven and earth are the basis of life, the ancestors are the basis of the family, and rulers and teachers are the basis of order”.[7] Li, then, roots itself deeply with the birth of humanity, the formulation of family, and sociopolitical order; it is a crucial force that harmonizes the natural institutions of heaven-and-earth, family, and society, through which “Heaven and earth join in in harmony, the sun and moon shine, the four season proceed in order, the stars and constellations march, the rivers flow, and all things flourish”.[8] Hence, not only is this li internally transformative, it also affirms a greater order of natural to be one that both imitates and take part in the maintenance of nature. As a result of this belief to li’s importance in both inner transformation and maintenance of nature, Xunzi’s li, to fulfill its two-fold function, is very minute and detailed to incorporate different aspects of social practices, from the proper dealing with auspicious and inauspicious events to the proper containment and display of one’s emotions. Especially detailed is the li of death: as a connecting force that joins man’s life with nature, death needs the most attention paid by li to maintain this natural order.

Why, then, exists li, this completion of learning, inner-transformative force that corresponds to nature? To Xunzi, this question is closely related to his understanding of human nature, and ultimately will be answered by human creativity. Xunzi shows a rather dim view on such a subject:

Man’s nature is evil; goodness is the result of conscious activity [偽]. The nature of man is such that he is born with a fondness for profit. If he indulges this fondness, it will lead him into wrangling and strife, and all sense of courtesy and humility will disappear. He is born with feelings of envy and hate, and if he indulges these, they will lead him into violence and crime, and all sense f loyalty and good faith will disappear. Man is born with the desires of the eyes and ears, with a fondness for beautiful sights and sounds. If he indulges these, they will lead him into license and wantonness, and all ritual principle and correct forms will be lost. Hence, any man who follows his nature and indulges his emotions will inevitably become involved in wrangling and strive, will violate the forms and rules of society, and will end as a criminal.[9]

Xunzi’s Hobbesian approach to man’s nature requires a solution to inevitable disorder that natural tendencies will cause. Unlike Hobbes who proposes a contractual relationship between man and a powerful sovereign who safeguards his life from others and maintain an external social order, Xunzi promotes the learning of li to internally transform man to become good—“man must first be transformed by the instructions of a teacher and guided by ritual principles, and only then will he be able to observe the dictates of courtesy and humility, obey the forms and rules of society, and achieve order”, with the end product of this learning and adjustment process the flourishing of goodness, “result of conscious activity”.[10]

From this notion of “conscious activity” 偽, then, a further question should be raised on the original origin of li, and of this “conscious activity”—what force contains this notion of creativity to generate these set of principles? Xunzi makes it clear that “all ritual principles are produced by the conscious activity of the sages; essentially they are not products of man’s nature”.[11] The sages, serving as the human par excellence both for their moral authority and their creativity ability, consciously creates li with a clear intension to maintain a form of sociopolitical and natural order. Taking the roles of ideal types of human achievement, these sages represent the collective effort of man to ordain proper order in maintaining the stability of society both internally in terms of interpersonal relationships, and externally in the relationship between man and nature. The creation process of li is completely conscious and artificial; it involves the sages, or humanity’s intelligence and wisdom as generative forces as a reaction to nature rather than a decreed patterning of heaven in the tradition of Zisi and Mencius: “the sage gathers together his thoughts and ideas, experiments with various forms of conscious activity, and so produces ritual principles and set forth laws and regulations”.[12] The gathering of “thoughts and ideas” and “experiments with various forms of conscious activity” marks Xunzi’s notion of human creativity a truly humanistic one; he does not doctrines that govern human behavior as laws or covenants with a personal God, or deliberate patterning to an external force, but instead places human creativity to the center stage to establish his proper place within to maintain society, and without to face nature.

Absent in Xunzi’s philosophy of li, then, is an active role for Heaven 天, the predominant concept of Confucianism in the tradition of Zisi and Mencius. In his “Discussion of Heaven”, Xunzi clearly states that “Heaven’s ways are constant… it does not prevail because of a sage like Yao; it does not cease to prevail because of a tyrant like Chieh”.[13] Xunzi separates man’s action with heaven’s will completely, and hence, removes from his moral philosophy a clear metaphysical connection to Heaven. To Xunzi man’s fortune is up to his own, and a sage is he who can realize this simple fact.[14] However, the passive role of Heaven in human creativity does not eliminate its significance; it is a complete and natural process on its own. Xunzi states, “to bring to completion without acting, to obtain without seeking—this is the work of Heaven”, which a sage does not attempt to imitate. [15] The natural cycle of heaven, with its change of four seasons, transformation of yin and yang, is a complete, godlike process that marks itself an accomplishment.[16] T, Xunzi’s notion of heaven is similar to a modern understanding of nature, beyond man’s control, operating on its own, yet influencing man in its phenomena. Man is bound by heaven only insofar as his action does not oppose the natural order of things, or expect from heaven what is beyond man’s power.[17]

The relationship between li, creativity, and Heaven in Xunzi, then, can be characterized by that of distinction and independently separate, autonomous existence. Li is a product of man, resulted from sages’ conscious activity to function in accordance to Heaven only insofar as its actions do not oppose Heaven’s natural order. Heaven, though its already complete pattern, though influencing li and man’s creativity by the boundary of its natural orders, cannot change or be changed beyond its completion. Human conscious action, or creativity, product of human intellect and wisdom, though the generator of li and an observer of Heaven, does not serve as a unifying force that unites man with Heaven.

Radically opposing Xunzi’s view on li, creativity, and Heaven is that of the school of Zisi and Mencius, as evident in Zhongyong. Instead of perceiving these three as separate, autonomous subjects, Zhongyong offers a holistic anthropocosmic unity that allows close interaction, patterning, and co-creation of the three. First, the concept of li is connected to ren 仁, or humanity:

Benevolence is the characteristic element of humanity [仁], and the great exercise of it is in loving relatives. Righteousness is the accordance of actions with what is right, and the great exercise of it is in honouring the worthy. The decreasing measures of the love due to relatives, and the steps in the honour due to the worthy, are produced by the principle of propriety [禮] [Zhongyong XX.5].[18]

Humanity, in turn, is further associated with the Zhongyong concept of creativity, known as co-creativity, cheng 誠, sometimes translated into sincerity:

The possessor of sincerity [誠] does not merely accomplish the self-completion of himself. With this quality he completes other men and things also. The completing himself shows his perfect virtue [仁]. The completing other men and things show his knowledge. Both these are virtues belonging to the nature, and this is the way by which a union is effected of the external and internal. Theserefore, whever he—the entirely sincere man—employs them, –that is, these virtues, –their action will be right [Zhongyong XXV.3].[19]

Cheng is best represented by the term co-creativity because it is the force that creates a metaphysics of morals for Zhongyong, that which connects man with heaven as co-creators in a cosmology characterized by anthropocosmic unity, 天人合一:

It is only the individual possessed of the most entire sincerity [誠] that can exist under heaven [天], who can adjust the great invariable relations of mankind, establish the great fundamental virtues of humanity, and know the transforming and nurturning operations of Heaven and Earth; –shall this individual have any being or anything beyond himself on which he depends? Call him man in his ideal [仁], how earnest he is! Call him an abyss, how deep is he! Call him Heaven [天], how vast is he! [XXXII.1-2].[20]

In the cosmology of Zhongyong, then, the concepts of li, creativity, and Heaven are connected by an individual, a possessor of co-creativity cheng 誠, that Tu Weiming describes as a “profound person” whom, “through a long and unceasing process of delving into his own ground of existence, discovers his true subjectivity not as an isolated selfhood but as a great source of creative transformation”.[21] This profound person, through his realization of heaven’s pattern and his role as a co-creator, does not create through his intelligence, but transmits through the pattern of heaven, the proper governance of action, li, as a spontaneous act from his inner humanity, ren 仁. Hence, through this active process of co-creativity, anthropocosmic unity 天人合一 is achieved.

An analogy of the cosmology of Xunzi and that of Zhongyong, then, presents two radically different approaches to the relationships between li, creativity, and Heaven. But perhaps these differences can be explained in terms of basic approaches by these two distinct schools of Confucianism. The school of Xunzi starts from a sociopolitical realistic perspective that, through realization of the baseness of human nature and man’s instinctual desires, seeks to create sociopolitical order through deliberate human creativity, conscious action 偽, to generate a set of conduct known as li from human intelligence and wisdom. The li is to be the completion of learning, which the man, with his base nature, ought to ceaselessly pursue to attain the good. Heaven plays no active role to the sociopolitical realist, who only wishes man not to disrupt its natural orders to create further chaos. Man’s role in Xunzi’s system serves as an intelligent and autonomous creator, who at the same time attempts to tame his nature through following the li of sages. Ultimately, each of the three concepts is distinct and autonomous, with no single unifying factor. Zhongyong, on the other hand, starts from a philosophical and optimistic approach to human nature, assuming its natural capacity for humanity, ren 仁, and allows a profound person to unify all three through his realization of cheng 誠, his capacity and duty of co-creativity. The process of this unification is man’s internal growth to the realization of 仁 through self-cultivation. Li is the natural external manifestation of this realization, rather than a process of normative learning of the good; it is patterned after man’s understanding of Heaven, as man acts in accordance to Heaven’s will. Although man in both of these texts assume this role of the creator, they are nonetheless different: while he who follows the school of Xunzi realizes and creates artifice through conscious action, 偽, the profound man interacts with Heaven to pattern with sincerity, 誠.

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03.13.07

阮籍“咏怀诗”之中鸟之比喻

Posted in 诗歌 at 2:58 pm by 若水

阮籍在其“咏怀诗”八十余首中有四首以鸟为主题，并在其中三首提到了“大鸟”与“小鸟”的对比，暗指“大志”与只求自保之“小志”。但诗人自己的感情却是矛盾的，一时愿比大鸟乘风而去，一时愿像小鸟般只在自己的花园中嬉戏。以下是诗文：
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八

灼灼西隤日。余光照我衣。
回風吹四壁。寒鳥相因依。
周周尚銜羽。蛩蛩亦念飢。
如何當路子。磬折忘所歸。
豈為夸譽名。憔悴使心悲。
宁与燕雀翔。不隨黃鵠飛。
黃鵠游四海。中路將安歸。
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在这首诗中作者将燕雀与黄鵠进行了对比；燕雀是“小鸟”，只能在庭院之间飞翔，而黄鵠则能云游四海。但诗人却“宁与燕雀翔。不隨黃鵠飛。” 黃鵠虽能“游四海”，却前途未果，不知能否平安归来，正如魏晋之交的官场，虽能带来荣华富贵，却不知是否会中途死于非命。
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二十一

於心怀寸陰。羲陽將欲冥。
揮袂撫長劍。仰觀浮云征。
云間有玄鶴。抗志揚哀聲。
一飛沖青天。曠世不再鳴。
豈与鶉鷃游。連翩戲中庭。
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《史记·滑稽列传》曰：“齐威王之时喜隐，好为淫乐长夜之饮，沈湎不治，委政卿大夫。淳于髡说之以隐曰：‘国中有大鸟，止王之庭，三年不蜚又不鸣，王知此鸟何也？’王曰：‘此鸟不飞则已，一飞冲天；不鸣则已，一鸣惊人。’” 诗中“玄鹤”正是引用了“一鸣惊人”的典故，“抗志揚哀聲。一飛沖青天。” 诗人甚感时之流逝，却恨自己大志未成，手持长剑却无处可施，看到浮云玄鹤，感慨自己之处境，不愿只与“鶉鷃游”，“連翩戲中庭”，而是希望自己也有一鸣惊人的机遇。这首诗与咏怀诗第八的题材相同，皆为大小之鸟，却表达了相反的寓意。诗中一处不甚明了——“旷世不再鸣”此句多被解释成一种诗人“一鸣惊人”的决意，说明他只要能有那一次机会哪怕之后不再鸣也可以接受。但换一种角度来说，玄鹤虽能一飞冲天，一鸣惊人，却不能再鸣，一去不回，岂不是另一种悲哀？
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四十三

鴻鵠相隨飛。飛飛适荒裔。
雙翮臨長風。須臾万里逝。
朝餐琅玕實。夕宿丹山際。
抗身青云中。网羅孰能制。
豈与鄉曲士。攜手共言誓。
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此诗与第八以及第二十一不同于诗人但调用“鴻鵠”而并无用一小鸟与其比之。“鴻鵠”与二十一之“玄鹤”相仿，“抗身青云中。网羅孰能制”。它不会与“鄉曲士”来“攜手共言誓”。这首诗与第八想比，则将“大鸟”与“小鸟”的比喻正好颠倒了过来。第八中“燕雀”为一小鸟，比喻隐士，能自由自在的在庭院中游玩，而“黃鵠”虽为大鸟，求功名之路，却不知中途能否平安归来。此诗中“大鸟”为隐士，自由自在的在天空中遨游，“雙翮臨長風。須臾万里逝”，不懈与那些世俗的曲士“共言誓”。此诗中尤可察觉阮籍受老庄之影响。《庄子·秋水》云：“曲士不可语于道者，束于教也。”
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四十六

鷽鳩飛桑榆。海鳥運天池。
豈不識宏大。羽翼不相宜。
招搖安可翔。不若栖樹枝。
下集蓬艾間。上游園圃篱。
但爾亦自足。用子為追隨。
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这首诗与第八相近，由”小鸟“的观点出发。鷽鳩为小鸟，海鸟为大鸟。但与其不同的是作者并没有申斥大鸟，而只是说明鷽鳩有自知之明，虽然知道自己不如海鸟的高大和翱翔之广，却也能在自己的园圃里自由自在的生活。同样，此诗为一隐士据官之诗。
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附：

晋书卷二十九列传第十九

 阮籍字嗣宗，陈留尉氏人也。父瑀，魏丞相椽，知名于世。籍容貌环杰，志气宏放，傲然独得，任性不羁，而喜怒不形于色。或闭户视书，累月不出；或登临山水，经日忘归。博览群籍，尤好《庄》《老》。嗜酒能啸，善弹琴。当其得意，忽忘形骸。时人多谓之痴，惟族兄文业每叹服之，以为胜己，由是咸共称异。 籍尝随叔父至东郡，兖州刺史王昶请与相见，终日不开一言，自以不能测。太尉蒋济闻其有隽才而辟之，籍诣都亭奏记曰：“伏惟明公以含一之德，据上台之位，英豪翘首，俊贤抗足。开府之日，人人自以为椽属；辟书始下，而下走为首。昔子夏在于西河之上，而文侯拥替；邹子处于黍谷之阴，而昭王陪乘。夫布衣韦带之士，孤居特立，王公大人所以礼下之者，为道存也。今籍无邹卜之道，而有其陋，猥见采择，无以称当。方将耕于东皋之阳，输黍稷之余税。负薪疲病，足力不强，补吏之召，非所克堪。乞回谬恩，以光清举。”初，济恐籍不至，得记欣然，遣卒迎之，而籍已去，济大怒。于是乡亲共喻之，乃就吏。后谢病归。复为尚书郎，少时，又以病免。及曾爽辅政，召为参军。籍因以疾辞，屏于田里，岁余而爽诛，时人服其远识。宣帝为太傅，命籍为从事中郎。及帝崩，复为景帝大司马从事中郎．高贵乡公即位，封关内侯，徙散骑常侍。 籍本有济世志，属魏晋之际，天下多故，名士少有全者，籍由是不与世事，遂酣饮为常。文帝初欲为武帝求婚于籍，籍醉六十日，不得言而止。钟会数以时事问之，欲因其可否而致之罪，皆以酣醉获免。及文帝辅政，籍常从容言于帝曰：“籍平生曾游东平，乐其风土。”帝大悦，即拜东平相，籍乘驴到郡，坏府舍屏鄣，使内外相望，法令清简，旬日而还。帝引为大将军从事中郎。有司言有子杀母者，籍曰：“嘻，杀父乃可，至杀母乎！”坐者怪其失言。帝曰：“杀父，天下极恶，而以为可乎？”籍曰：“禽兽知母而不知父，杀父，禽兽之类也。杀母，禽兽之不若。”众乃悦服。 籍闻步兵厨营人善酿，有贮酒三百斛，乃求为步兵校尉。遗落世事，虽去佐职，恒游府内，朝宴必与焉。会帝让九锡，公卿将劝进，使籍为其辞。籍沈醉忘作，临诣府，使取之，见籍方据案醉眠。使者以告，籍便书案，使写之，无所改窜。辞甚清壮，为时所重。 籍虽不拘礼教，然发言玄远，口不臧否人物。性至孝，母终，正与人围棋，对者求止，籍留与决赌。既而饮酒二斗，举声一号，吐血数升。及将葬，食一蒸肫，饮二斗酒，然后临诀，直言穷矣，举声一号，因又吐血数升。毁瘠骨立，殆致灭性。裴楷往吊之，籍散发箕踞，醉而直视，楷吊唁毕便去。或问楷：“凡吊者、主哭，客乃为礼。籍既不哭，君何为哭？”楷曰：“阮籍既方外之士，故不崇礼典。我俗中之士，故以轨仪自居。”时人叹为两得。籍又能为青白眼，见礼俗之士，以白眼对之。及嵇喜来吊，籍作白眼，喜不悸而退，喜弟康闻之，乃斋酒挟琴造焉，籍大悦，乃见青眼。由是礼法之士疾之若仇，而帝每保护之。 籍嫂尝归宁，籍相见与别。或讥之，籍曰：“礼岂为我设邪！”邻家少妇有美色，当户垆沽酒。籍尝诣饮，醉，便卧其侧。籍既不自嫌，其夫察之，亦不疑也。兵家女有才色，未嫁而死。籍不识其父兄，径往哭之，尽哀而还。其外坦荡而内淳至，皆此类也。时率意独驾，不由径路，车迹所穷，辄恸哭而反，尝登广武，观楚汉战处，叹曰：“时无英雄，使竖子成名！”登武牢山，望京邑而叹，于是赋《豪杰诗》。景元四年冬卒，时年五十四。 籍能属文，初不留思。作《咏怀诗》八十余篇，为世所重。著《达庄论》，叙无为之贵。文多不录。 籍尝于苏门山遇孙登，与商略终古及栖神导气之术，登皆不应，籍因长啸而退。至半岭，闻有声若鸾凤之音，响乎岩谷，乃登之啸也。遂归著《大人先生传》，其略曰：“世人所谓君子，惟法是修，惟礼是克。后执圭壁，足履绳墨。行欲为目前检，言欲为无穷则。少称乡党，长闻邻国。上欲图三公，下不失九州牧。独不见群虱之处裤(库换军)中，逃乎深缝，匿乎坏絮，自以为吉宅也。行不敢离缝际，动不敢出裤裆，自以为得绳墨也。然炎丘火流，焦邑灭都，群虱处于裤中而不能出也。君子之处域内，何异夫虱之处裤中乎！”此亦籍之胸怀本趣也。

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03.12.07

Essay: Critique of Max Weber’s Religion of China

Posted in 人文 at 3:23 am by 若水

Critique of Max Weber’s Religion of Chian

Upon completion of the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Max Weber initiated a project to answer this question: why has modern capitalism only emerged in the western world? Or, more specifically, what qualities of the protestant ethic, i.e. puritan ethic, marked its difference with those of other major traditions to solely allow a western emergence of the spirit of capitalism? This project explains the structure and content of his Religion of China; examining Confucianism and Taoism from the particular cultural-historical background of China, Weber concludes that divergent historical development results primarily from ethical, rather than political-economic differences. This difference does not emerge from either religion’s lack of rationalism, which, as Weber states, “To judge the level of rationalization a religion represents we may use two primary yardsticks which are in many ways interrelated. One is the degree to which the religion has divested itself of magic; the other is the degree to which it has systematically unified the relation between God and the world and therewith its own ethical relationships to the world”.[1] Both of these qualities, as presented in the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, manifest in the Protestant religion. Confucianism on the other hand achieves the same level of rationalism by these two standards; it eschews magic as Confucius seldom speaks about “prodigies, magic powers, disorder and spirits”, and it insists “that Heaven is the ultimate source of human virtues, that the Mandate of Heaven can be known through one’s conscious search in one’s nature and/or in the natural and human world, and that fulfillment of Heaven’s Mandate is nothing other than undertaking self-cultivation and extending one’s virtues to others and to the world”.[2] Yet the two types of developed rationalism mutually exclude one another, resulting in two different historical developments.[3] Confucianism forms a rational adjustment rather than Protestantism’s rational mastery of the world.[4] That is to say, through adjustment Confucianism becomes a force of traditionalism that impedes the rationalistic development of capitalism.[5] This paper shall closely analyze Weberian perception of Confucianism and Protestantism’s divergences in rationalization in terms of their perception of salvation, which creates a tension between the supra-mundane and the mundane, asceticism, and, taking into consideration their respective political-historical development, life-aspirations. Then, it shall critique the Weberian understanding of Chinese Confucianism, noting his misconceptions of elements supposedly lacking in the said religion, to conclude that although Weber successfully observes Confucianism’s lack of development for capitalist mentality, he fails to perceive the reason for such absence.

The concept of salvation, present in Protestantism and absent in Weberian conception of Confucianism, shall be the first point of comparison. The concept of salvation is pivotal to the Protestant religion; it places a goal distant and separate from life that essentially checks one’s behavior in life; a subject faces two choices, viz. the morally upright life or eternal condemnation. This choice results from a “contrast between ‘god’ or ‘nature’ and ‘statutory law’ or ‘convention’”[6]. That is to say, a dichotomy of the supra-mundane and the mundane is established, with the vision of the former closely monitoring the ethics of the latter. It is through this separation, along with the rationalization of a worldly asceticism that the protestant ethic evolves into the spirit of capitalism. However, as Weber notes, the Christian concept of salvation is absent in the Confucian tradition—“a conflict in the Christian manner between the interest in the salvation of one’s soul and the demands of the natural social order was inconceivable”.[7] Instead of focusing one’s attention to a distant, supra-mundane reality, the Confucian is “saved” from “barbaric lack of education”.[8] The Confucian ethics considers this worldly life of paramount importance and seeks improvement with education solely within the scope of a conceivable, natural life. Weber comprehends it as a “system of radical worldly optimism [that] succeeded in removing the basic pessimistic tension between the world and the supra-mundane destination of the individual”.[9] Because it lacks “any tension between nature and deity, between ethical demand and human shortcoming, consciousness of sin and need for salvation, conduct on earth and comprehension in the beyond, religious duty and sociopolitical reality”, Confucianism cannot support “conduct through inner forces freed of tradition and convention”.[10] Whereas the existence of such tension creates man’s forceful adjustment of the world, taken as material, to his internal ideas, the lack thereof, as manifested in the case of Confucianism, harmonizes to adjust “to the outside, to the conditions of the ‘world’”, producing a “style of life… characterized by essentially negative traits”.[11] Indeed, Weber sees Confucian rationalism a process that deters man from forming a “unified personality” which is “a whole placed methodically under a transcendental goal”.[12] Hence, the Weberian perception of Confucianism is one that lacks any touch of divinity; without transcendence, manifested in the tension between the supra-mundane and the mundane, without salvation, it imprisons souls to a world of traditions and conventions. This world, in addition, is one of inter-human relations, bound by propriety, without duties to a supra-human divinity, or even a sense of abstract community. A person is to sustain his five relationships with his lord, his father, his brothers, his wife, and his friends in harmony, fulfilling a personist principle, “undoubtedly as great a barrier to impersonal rationalization as it was generally to impersonal matter of factness”.[13] Hence, lacking the concept of salvation serves as the first great obstacle for Confucian ethic to advance to a spirit of capitalism. However, missing also in the Confucian tradition is the notion of asceticism, whose worldly form plays a catalyst in the transformation of the Protestant ethic into the spirit of capitalism.

Asceticism, evident in the Protestant ethics, produces a “relentlessly and religiously systematized utilitarianism… to live “in” the world and yet not be ‘of’ it”, which creates “superior rational aptitude and therewith the spirit of the vocational man, which… was denied to Confucianism”.[14] On the contrary, the Confucian way of life, though rational, is “determined, unlike Puritanism, from without rather than from within”, resulting in “mere sobriety and thriftiness combined with acquisitiveness and regard for wealth… far from representing and far from releasing the ‘capitalist spirit,’ in the sense that this is found in the vocational man of the modern economy”.[15] According to Weber, “asceticism and contemplation, mortification and escape from the world were not only unknown in Confucianism but were despised as parasitism”.[16] As a result, the Confucian never engages in the Puritan—Protestant par excellence—form of “rationalism”, of which “the typical Puritan earned plenty, spent little, and reinvested his income as capital in rational capitalist enterprise out of an asceticist compulsion to save”.[17] Instead, “the typical Confucian used his own and his family’s savings in order to acquire a literary education and to have himself trained for the examinations… thus he gained the basis for a cultured status position”.[18] Therefore, the Confucian ethic sans ascetic element produces a kind of contradiction that drives one into fame rather than capitalist enterprises; he lacks the transcendental, ascetic goal of the Puritan, “the true Christian, the other-worldly and inner-worldly asceticist, [who] wishes to be nothing more than a tool of his God”.[19] While the Confucian sought worldly pursuits, no great economic accumulation results; while the Puritan eschews the very same pursuit, the spirit of capitalism begets. The result from the lack of salvation and asceticism in Confucian doctrines embedded in the particular historical development of an early patrimonial imperial bureaucracy creates a society with life-aspiration focused on status, manifests in a privileged literati class with prestige in officialdom as its highest aspirations in life.

The patrimonial system trains a “superior man” mastered in the art of propriety who both opposes commercial activities and seeks personal gains in office, and who opposes useful training of a socially useful man and seeks self-cultivation through learning. In short, he is expected to become a moral man, not a Puritan individual who seeks his own salvation and engages in worldly asceticism from his sense of duty, of calling from God; however, his very focus on worldly morality produces a fortune-hunter without real spiritual guidance. On one hand, the Confucian opposes commercial activities, which Confucius denounces to be those of profit and unsuitable for a superior man. He further separates himself from the Protestant ideal of one who becomes a tool; instead, “the fundamental assertion, ‘a cultured man is not a tool’ meant that he was an end in himself and not just a means for a specified useful purpose”.[20] On the other hand, the only way for a Confucian to prove himself a “cultured man” or “superior man” is through the gaining of official position through various examination systems; he has no God to reaffirm his inner value—only societal recognition would serve the purpose. In addition, because the Confucian generates “an absolutely agnostic and essentially negative mood opposed to all hopes for a beyond”, he places his “’messianic’ hope for a this-worldly Savior-Emperor” and employs himself to be an official, an aide, to that glorified individual.[21] As Weber observes, the Confucian goes as far as “deifying ‘wealth’” and engages in unlawful activities of acquiring wealth in the short terms of his office, while at the same time show condescendence to merchants and profiteering.[22] The Confucian, because of his worldly aspirations in life, engages in adjustment to vanity fair, acknowledging wealth while surrendering to enjoyment. The resulting ethic from this aspiration, along with the previously stated absence of salvation and asceticism, is a rationalism of adjustment that opposes the mentality of capitalism. [23] Further, Confucianism does not lead to any formulations of newer ethics as it necessarily supports and reinforces its current, patrimonial system, as its “reason” is a “rationalism of order” essentially “pacifist in nature”.[24] Hence, in drawing these various differences Confucian ethic hold from protestant ethic, Weber postulates a possible explanation to a historical fact: while modern spirit of capitalism emerged in the west through rationalization of the protestant ethic, its impossibility of development in China can be partially a result of a stagnant Confucian ethics.

This paper, then, has compared Weber’s notion of Confucianism with Protestantism as an attempt to explain China’s lack of capitalist mentality in his Religion of China. Although Weber quite accurately describes the economic-historical reality of China’s lack of capitalist, and also its lack of capitalist mentality (“spirit of capitalism”), and perhaps too these realities are partially in fact caused by an impeding force of Confucianism, his understanding of Confucianism in many areas are Eurocentric and erroneous. Confucianism, contrary to Weberian understanding, not only has an ascetic element and a spiritually inspired life-aspiration, but also an acknowledgement of supra-mundane reality, that is, a salvation of a kind. However, true to its western lineage, while the Weberian description of a capitalist-mentality-generating ethic requires a dichotomy, a contradiction, or a “tension” between supra-mundane and the mundane world, the Confucian model by its own light disregards these tensions as unnatural and seeks to harmonize opposing forces. Weber, indeed, is very correct in stating that “Confucian rationalism meant rational adjustment to the world; Puritan rationalism meant rational mastery of the world”.[25] But this difference cannot be used as a value-judgmental basis to apologize for Confucianism’s lack of development. Indeed, Confucianism never developed a spirit of capitalism because such a notion takes no place in Confucian spirituality; it is simply unnecessary. The Religion of China ultimately fails to comprehend Confucian ethics and its negligence of capitalistic development because its approach, similar to its subject of Protestantism, is itself a product of western rationalism that requires and focuses on various “tensions”, or individual parts that serve utilitarian purposes, rather than that of a holistic philosophy.

To properly understand Confucianism, especially its heavy emphasis on the world here and now, one has to first attempt an understanding of its basic weltanschauung. A key concept, anthropocosmic unity, ought to be explained prior to the discussion of Confucian asceticism, life-aspiration, and ultimately, harmony between the supra-mundane and the mundane world. Anthropocosmic unity, or “unity between heaven and man” (tianrenheyi), “has been generally regarded a feature uniquely characteristic of Chinese religious and philosophical imagination”.[26] In Confucian belief there always exists a concept of heaven (tian) that, contrary to Weber’s notion that it completely lacks metaphysics, are at least omniscient and omnipresent, though not necessarily omnipotent.[27] Chinese emperors called themselves “sons of heavens” as direct inheritors of the will of heaven; the concept of “mandate of heaven” is further used to justify the transition of dynasties.[28] This heaven is omnipresent because everything on earth is encompassed in heaven; it is omniscient because heaven and human form a co-operative relationship in seeing, hearing, and adjusting to the environment.[29] However, unlike the Protestant God, Heaven assumes not the sole power of creation, and hence, not omnipotent. It is through this distinction that the Confucian heaven doesn’t stand as a force completely separate from man, and allows a different type of transcendence which enables man to become a co-creator with heaven.[30] Ying-Shi Yü, following the tradition of Karl Jaspers, notices that during a period known as “Axial breakthrough” different religious traditions “led directly to the emergence of the dichotomy between the actual world and the world beyond”, which “essentially what transcendence is all about: the actual world is transcended but not negated”.[31] Confucian transcendence, however, does not fully qualify this condition: “In the Chinese breakthrough, the two worlds, actual and transcendental, do not appear to have been sharply divided”.[32]. The result is a tradition that focuses on an “inward transcendence” through the notion of anthropocosmic unity (tianrenheyi), one which links the “two worlds, actual and transcendental… by the purified mind/heart in a way ‘neither identical nor separate’”.[33] Yü distinguishes the Confucian transcendence from the west: “The Chinese transcendental world is not systematically externalized, formalized, or objectified… After the Axial breakthrough, Chinese thinkers tended not to apply their imaginative powers to nature, shape, characteristics, and so on of the world beyond… This Chinese attitude contrasts sharply with the Western predilection to imagine, often vividly and profusely, about the world beyond with the aid of speculative reason”.[34] The path to this anthropocosmic unity, undoubtedly, is self-cultivation; the Confucian thrives for “the quest for sagehood”, as Julia Ching says, “the heart of Confucianism”.[35] Without an understanding of anthropocosmic unity, this quest indeed would seem Weberian Confucian and worldly in nature; however, with proper understanding, this quest is now a Confucian’s path to become united with Heaven, to find inner transcendence, to work his own salvation in this world, but nonetheless retain an understanding of the greater world of Heaven.

Similar to the concept of salvation, those of asceticism and life-aspiration also exist for Confucianism. Ching notices that important concepts of “self-conquest” (keji) for “restoring propriety” (fuli) are found in Confucian Analects. It is a process of continuous self-examination which Neo-Confucians used to keep “spiritual account” of themselves.[36] This asceticism, however, “remained a disciple of moderation, which did not inspire any flight into deserts or produce any monastic movement. The Confcuian teaching was to control one’s passions, not to live as if one were without them. Besides, Confucian asceticism was always practiced for the sake of a higher goal: that of rendering the individual more humane for others, in the service of a larger group, namely, the family and the society”. [37] Confucianism also contains life-aspirations beyond office-seeking of the literati class, as Weber suggests. Earlier in the paper it is already stated that the Confucian seeks sagehood and anthropocosmic unity as his life-long goal. It is perhaps more lucid to term the Confucian life-aspiration one of “holistic humanism”. Drawing from the opening lines of Great Learning, Confucian scholar Tu Weiming notes that Confucian ethic is one of humanism, in the sense that it emphasizes on the human ability of self-transformation and self-cultivation, and one of holism because it perceives one’s conduct of self, family, state, and all-under-heaven (tianxia) as inseparable parts of an expending concentric circle, with “self” serving as its inner core.[38] Indeed, “for Confucianism, life is [] a process of continuous self-cultivation and self-transformation leading to self-transcendence, the realization of one’s authentic nature in which the all-pervasive principle of Heaven are fully manifested”.[39]

Since Confucianism contains asceticism, life-aspiration, and salvation, why does it lack seeds to the capitalist mentality? Weberian observation of the socioeconomic reality results from fundamental Confucian disregard of tension for the sake of harmony, or he. The asceticism described above is to be distinguished from the Puritan asceticism, which relies on a contradictory tension between service to God and accumulation of capital. The fundamental approach to Confucian asceticism—harmony through moderation—eliminates an asceticism of tension; a Confucian would find the Puritan model unnatural. Evident in Confucianism is its life-aspiration, but this, too, lacks a notion of “tension” that the protestant model relies. Whereas the Protestant ethic creates a life-aspiration through calling of God to become “nothing more than a tool of his God, in [which] he thought his destiny”, the Confucian would see this tension between God and man, or master and his tool, as a disruption of the cosmic harmony.[40] Indeed, while the Protestant man sets to master the nature entrusted by God, the Confucian lives with the nature, a part of the heaven with whom he unites. Fundamentally, it is the Confucian salvation, a complete internal process of self-cultivation and inner transcendence, which renders capitalist mentality indifferent to him. The capitalist mentality, as Weber describes, results from the rationalization of a tension between asceticism and fulfilling God’s will for material production; the Confucian rationalization of inner transcendence, asceticism without monasticism, and life-aspiration of holistic humanism, does not need a capitalist mentality to serve its will. The quest for sagehood does not need material and economic manifestations. The office-seeking mentality and profiteering of officeholders observed by Weber are but deviants to the appropriate interpretation of the Confucian tradition—similar deviations exist in other traditions as well. These deviations should not be used to judge the normative ethic of the Confucian life-aspiration.

At this point, though, it is necessary to consider Weber’s approach to Religion of China itself; key to his theory is the concept of “rationalization”, which is the process of tension between every religion’s rational, ethical imperative with irrationalities, or traditions of the world.[41] Confucianism abandons possible tensions for harmony; to judge it in terms of a theory based on fundamental tension perhaps dwarfs its true light. For a Confucian, rationalization of his self-cultivation and quest for anthropocosmic unity signifies moral bankruptcy and justification for politico-economic gains of vanity. Such a process cannot be accepted by a tradition that never separates facts from morality, or, human from his perception of heaven. In conclusion, the Weberian analysis in Religion of China materializes a convincing argument to explain China’s lack of development in capitalist mentality from Confucian ethic. However, Weber fails to locate the real cause of such absence s a result of his inability to perceive Confucianism beyond a Eurocentric, rationalist perspective. In order to understand Confucianism and its necessary, deliberate rejection of capitalist mentality, it is imperative to understand Confucianism as an anthropocosmic tradition that discards dichotomy of tensions for harmony of coexistence.

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03.08.07

Cao Zhi: Sigh

Posted in 诗歌 at 3:29 am by 若水

我翻译的曹植诗歌一首：吁嗟篇
Cao Zhi: Sigh

I sigh for this tumbleweed
How solitary it stands, facing the world!
Original root, long deceased
Day and night, ceaseless unrest!
From east to west, crossing seven roads
South to north, traversing nine paths.
Suddenly I encountered a whirlwind
Lifting me to the clouds.
I exclaimed to self–exhaust these roads heavenly!
But unexpectedly to a sunken pit I descended–
Until delivered by a timely cyclone
Returned I to the middle of the fields.
But south changed to north
And east I thought, but to west it reversed.
Loafing around, I was without a host:
Once lost, now miraculously preserved.
Swinging through the Eight Marshes
Waving across the Five Mountains
With no settled home I wondered–
And my pains and hardships–them who would know?
I rather become one planted in the woods
And burn! In autumn with wild fires.
Excruciating I decay;
And my only desire: to rejoin with my roots!

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03.07.07

Michaël Dudok de Wit短篇动画两段

Posted in 杂谈 at 1:21 am by 若水

在朋友的博客上看了第一段动画Father and Daughter，很感动，但同时又一种无奈感。在网上找到了第二段The Monk and the Fish。这两篇同为Michael Dudok De Wit所作。若水有感：虽然都有一个类似的主题，但表达的方式则不同。上面的那段是消极的，而这段是积极的。上面那段更有一种艺术性美感，而下面的则更活泼、轻松。

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03.06.07

曹植：吁嗟篇

Posted in 诗歌 at 3:52 am by 若水

吁嗟篇

吁嗟此轉蓬，
居世何獨然。
長去本根逝，
宿夜無休閑。
東西經七陌，
南北越九阡。
卒遇回風起，
吹我入雲間。
自謂終天路，
忽然下沉淵。
驚飆接我出，
故歸彼中田。
當南而更北，
謂東而反西。
宕宕當何依，
忽亡而複存。
飄颻周八澤，
連翩歷五山。
流轉無恆處，
誰知吾苦艱。
願為中林草，
秋隨野火燔。
糜滅豈不痛，
願與根荄連。

–
曹植在这首诗用“转蓬”的比喻象征了他苦难的生活。就如转蓬一般，诗人的生活是孤独的，一个人面对着一个敌对的政治世界。他的“根”——父亲的宠爱、公子的地位、无忧无虑的生活——早已不再，犹如漂泊在外，一日不可安宁。他曾经过着军旅生活，随父亲南征北战，没时间休息。命运就如转蓬一般，随着外在的力量而起伏波动。一会儿被吹到天上，好像马上能荣华富贵走尽天路，却又因为政治事件而坠入深渊（另外一版本做“沉泉”，代表黄泉）。好在最后性命保住了，如转蓬回归田里。可惜此时所有的一切都颠倒了，原本面南变成了北，以为要往东却反转到西。没有任何依靠，诗人死里逃生：这个“死”与“存”是象征性的也是现实的。接着诗人被动的被他的政治敌人（也就是曹丕）发配到不同封地，南北使唤，不得一日安宁，苦难不堪。最后四行则表现出了诗人的美好理想：他宁愿成为一颗普通的“中林草”，自然地在秋天随野火烧尽——当然，春风之下还会再生。相比之下，转蓬这样在异乡糜灭是多么的痛苦！转蓬和诗人一样，都极度渴望着能重新与它们的“根”相连，恢复平静的生活。

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03.04.07

古希腊诗数首

Posted in 诗歌 at 5:04 pm by 若水

昨日在书店里翻到了Pure Pagan这本古希腊诗集，翻译者为Burton Raffel。诗集中有几首很短、却甚有味道的诗歌，愿在此与大家分享。
–
Alkaios (公元前7世纪之诗人，生在莱斯博斯岛，并被放逐至埃及）

Frankness
Speak
As you please
And hear
What can never
Please

率直
说
使你欢悦的
听
使你永不会
欢悦的

Friendship
Friends? My friends are nothing,
And I weep for them,
And for me.

友谊
朋友？他们什么都不是，
我为他们哭泣，
也为自己。

Philosophy
Nothing
Will
Come
Of
Anything.

哲理
没有
不会
生
于
任何。

Sorrow
Sorrow:
You’ve made me completely forget sorrow.

悲哀
悲哀：
你让我完全忘却了悲哀。

Truth (这首诗相信了解希腊文化的朋友们会理解的）
Boy:
Boy:
Wine

And

Truth.

真理
男童：
男童：
美酒

和

真理。
–
Plato

An Epitaph (墓志铭都是各有意义）
I am a drowned man’s tomb. There is a farmer’s.
Death waits for us all, whether at sea or on land.

墓志铭
我乃溺水人之墓。它是种田人的。
死亡等待我们所有人，海洋里或陆地上。
–
Theodoridas

An Epitaph
There is a drowned man’s tomb. Sail on, stranger,
For when we went down the other ships sailed on.

墓志铭
这里是溺水人之墓。继续航行吧，陌生人，
我们海难时其余的船只亦会继续航行。
–
Hegemon

Thermopylae
Passing this tomb, some somber stranger
Might say: “Here the courage of a thousand Spartans
Stopped a million Persians, and died facing
The enemy. This is what Sparta means.”

塞莫皮莱
路过此墓，一些忧郁的陌生人
可能会说：“在这里斯巴达千人勇士
停下了一百万波斯人，面对敌人
死亡。这就是斯巴达的意义。”

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03.03.07

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr过世

Posted in 时事 at 3:06 pm by 若水

2月28日，著名知识分子、自由主义者、历史学家以及我校校友Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. 去世了。他出生于1917年，并于1938年从我校历史文学专业毕业，论文为对Orestes A. Brownson之研究。Schlesinger荣获普利策奖两次，其一为Age of Jackson，主要讲述了杰克逊时代美国如何是由Jeffersonian democracy逐渐演变成Jacksonian democracy的。并通过Democractic Republican党与Federalist党，Democractic党与Whig党之间的“斗争”来表明美国现代民主自由的根源；虽然其书章节繁多而缺少一主体的记叙，却通过此主线表达了作者之意愿。其二为A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in The White House，讲诉他作为肯尼迪白宫顾问的事情，笔者尚未读过，无资格评价。Schlesinger一生都为美国自由主义效力，并不在其作品中试图掩盖他自己的看法，值得敬佩。详细可见这里或wikipedia.

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03.01.07

Summers论中国经济

Posted in 时事 at 8:05 pm by 若水

周一上海股市大跌前，哈佛前校长、经济学家Larry Summers发表了这篇有关中国经济的文章，题曰”A Japanese Lesson for China”。作者提到，今日的中国之经济发展是不可否定的。它含有以下特点：高saving/investment rate、强大的中央银行储备和盈余所带来的汇率调控、以及以银行为主、高度控制、支持国内企业的金融系统、以及与政府紧密联系的工业。他说，现在的中国经济与1980年代末1990年代初的日本经济非常相近：

All of this describes what is happening in China, and with our relationship with Beijing, today. It also describes the Japanese economy in the late 1980s and early 1990s, before its lost decade of deflation and considerable deterioration in global prestige. Although there are obvious differences, notably China’s much lower level of development, the similarities are striking enough to invite an effort to draw some lessons from the Japanese experience.

但是日本1990年代所面对的则是一个备受世界耻笑的经济萧条:

The definitive history of Japan’s dismal decade has yet to be written. But most observers would agree that key elements included the bursting of stock market and land bubbles, the resulting problems in the financial system, the collapse of aggregate demand as banks stopped extending credit and the difficulty of moving from export-led growth to domestic-led growth once consumer and business confidence was lost.

我们通过后见之明则可发现当时日本的问题很大程度上是政府政策错误所造成的：

they followed easy monetary and financial policies that gave rise to huge asset price bubbles and expansions in credit, which set the stage for the downturn. At the same time, they failed to encourage a shift to domestic demand-led growth at a moment when consumers were enjoying record increases in wealth. And they allowed problems in the banking system to fester

也就是说，如果中国不接受日本所犯下错误的教训，则有可能在不久的将来上演日本90年代的好戏。Summers认为，明智的政策应该包括扩宽和放松汇率、允许人民币升值，和鼓励消费来推动国内需求所带来的长远经济发展。而这些政策在经济情况大好时推广则比在萧条后再来补救要容易得多。

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