03.11.08
Posted in 人文, 说书 at 8:38 pm by 若水
霍克海默与阿尔多诺的名作《启蒙辩证法》(the Dialectic of Enlightenment)代表了法兰克福学派对启蒙运动及受其深厚影响的现代社会之批判。法兰克福学派作为西方马克思主义的代表在欧陆战争后与第三国际式的马列主义分道扬镳。作为一个放弃了直接暴力革命与无产阶级独裁的学派而言，法兰克福学派亦没有走向伯恩斯坦所代表的康德式修正主义，而是从学术的立场在肯定革命的必要性下（本雅明认为革命是一种末世性的救赎，而阿尔多诺则认为它是一个有取向性的憧憬）冷眼观察和批判工业化、都市化、和机械化的现代社会。但法兰克福学派的诸位却又不甘于只做学术，认为思想和行动是不可分开的，以“批判理论”此名来形容他们对社会实践其思想的理念。
霍克海默和阿尔多诺认为启蒙运动归根结底来说是失败的。启蒙运动代表了魔法社会（玛娜）与科学社会的分界线。科学社会的根本理论是工具理性：其宗旨是把所有的事物和关联性都减小为最低限度的形成体，进行测量，并将其作为工具以用之。而不能被简化为最低限度形成体的现象则被忽略。社会的单位变为了个体：架于个体之上的总体性社会现象则就此失去了意义。在其客观性了解世界的同时，启蒙理性物化了世界。个体虽然存在，却无法保留其主体性；集体虽然存在，却无法解释集体行动（praxis）：启蒙理性是无法从主观和相对的角度出发来了解世界的。启蒙辩证法的目的就是在于通过辩证法来说明启蒙理性的种种问题。在霍克海默和阿尔多诺眼里，启蒙运动所带来的科学性思想最终导致了社会对个人的压迫甚至法西斯主义。
《启蒙辩证法》选择了《奥德赛》中的主人公奥德修斯来代表启蒙理性的锥形。霍克海默和阿尔多诺提到，奥德修斯可以在其本人不在的二十年时一样让其王国正常运行。牧户和佃户照常工作，王后虽然名义上代表了王权却并没有执行任何权力——这就是理性的力量。而另一方面，奥德修斯对与其飘扬地中海的士兵水手的控制也是绝对的。面对海妖歌声的诱惑，奥德修斯命令其手下堵住耳朵，不受影响。而对于自己他的要求则相反。作为启蒙理性的代理人他需要对证明和享受自己权力带来的果实：所以他要受到诱惑，要享受海妖的歌声。但同时启蒙理性的代言人却不是自由的。他在定义自己的权力时已经放弃了自己的主体性，所以他必须要通过工具理性来“控制”非理性的部分——欲望。所以他要求部下把自己绑在桅杆上，直到船离开海妖所在的领域为止。那末，奥德修斯在遭遇海妖的过程中就充分体现了启蒙理性的弊病。一方面其根本是控制，另一方面其本质是压抑。在奥德修斯听到海妖歌声却不能离开的狂喜和痛苦中，代表启蒙运动的工具理性已经在人类最早的记载中展现了身影。
诚然，霍克海默和阿尔多诺的比喻并非完全合理。将一近代现象追溯到远古史诗时代本身就是一种忽略了历史性特征的做法。而且奥德修斯作为一英雄人物其本身既是大于凡人的；他的英雄式意志并不能和普世性的启蒙理性相比。作为一个多元性的个体（polutropon/ man of many turns），奥德修斯并不是一个只有理性和运用理性去看待世界的。他并不只把一切事物都简化成可以测量和控制的变量，而是保有了一个更全面的世界观。虽然知道他的性格会导致他马上将再次踏上旅途，虽然知道伊萨卡并不能给他带来一切，奥德修斯还是义无反顾地一点一点地朝着他的家乡走去。这种精神是霍克海默和阿尔多诺所批判的启蒙理性所不必备的，也是一种对科学理性相反的“魔法社会”的朝圣。
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03.20.07
Posted in 人文 at 2:16 am by 若水
晚上从燕京走出时发现又一次下雪了：过马路时，右侧的车灯印现出一粒粒的小雪花，像尘埃似的随风飞扬。黑暗。寒冷。毫无三月下旬应有的春意。有一种沉闷压抑的感觉，只想从速进入一个受保护的避难所，不想多逗留，就找到了一小门进入深红之园。小门不是往常熟悉，刻有庄严谚语的Dexter Gate，也不是Widener图书馆后面的大门，只是一个叫不上名字的小门。呈拱形，如园内的建筑一样由深红的砖块铸成。一盏暗黄的吊灯照亮了门内，微小的灯火驱逐了黑暗，却带来了另外一种威胁。不能在此久留！我欲离去，却突然发现了左侧墙上粉笔写的几行字——向后看；好奇心使我不知不觉地转身朝右侧的墙上望去，眼睛却恍惚了一阵子，只看到了几行同样粉笔书写的文字中间的两行——“沉默还不如死亡，那么就呐喊吧！” 沉默？死亡？呐喊！得承认当时确实被这几行不知哪位左派分子书写的愤世之言所打动，不由被震撼了一小会儿。对，不能沉默。阳明先生的“知行合一”之理不正是这样吗？如果找到了“道”——哪怕只是它的一小部分——却只沉默而留给自己，不就是没有办法把知道的履行而为“一事”吗？既然这样，就允许我一小会儿分享点想法吧！
之前与一位朋友交谈时提到了大家上大学期间很早即一个一个拼着命找实习接下来找工作的现象。我甚感不快，毕竟从自己的角度出发相信一个堂堂的大学教育应该不单单只是一个通往好工作、什么“成功之道”的垫脚石而已。说到最后，无论我们用什么借口来解释自己“现实性”的行动，不就是一种向社会的功利性妥协吗？如果用是否“妥协”来衡量一个人的生活的话，我们往往认为有两种状态：一种自然是“妥协”，也就是积极的参与社会成为社会机械的一分子——不管是为了名利、金钱还只是为了一个平稳的家庭生活，都是一种“妥协”；另外一种自然是“不妥协”，也就是理想主义者或者一个人理想主义阶段向社会风俗挑战的状态——结果往往是失望或者在一定时间后最终选择“妥协”。笔者认为，如果只从一个二元的观点来看这个问题的话就会陷入这个Either/or的弊端，在迫使主体进行二者之间的选择同时把他的自由已经限制在二者之间了。无论是”妥协“还是”不妥协“，都是有了一个明确的”妥协目标”——社会风气——而被动存在的。妥协自然不用说，但问题是哪怕”不妥协“也是建立在一种消极的排斥它的对立面，也就是”妥协”，才能存在的。如果用尼采的话来说的话，二者都是一种slave morality的表现。笔者认为，实际上第三种乃至更多的选择是存在的。也就是说，应该有一种境界是“现实的理想化”的：虽不接受社会风气，不愿“妥协”，却也不厌世而“不妥协”，而以自身的行动来创造一种超越性的存在。曾子云：“夫子之道，忠恕而已矣”（《论语·里仁》。忠诚与社会，以一种仁慈之心来看待它的风气与现象，体谅大家的选择，却同时以自身来做到超越性的存在，在身为其一部分时不必与大家走同样的道路却力图使大家都能走上对他们最好的、正确的道路，不就是所谓的“夫子之道”吗？
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03.19.07
Posted in 人文 at 2:16 am by 若水
今日苦读阳明先生《传习录》，读到以下一段，觉得应该与海内外的广大学子们分享一番：
問：「讀書所以調攝此心，不可缺的。但讀之之時，一種科目意思牽引而來，不知同以免此？」先主曰：「只要良知真切，雖做舉榮，不為心累，雖有累，亦易覺克之而已。且如讀書時，良知知得強記之心不是，即克去之，有欲速之心不是，即克去之，有誇多斗靡之心不是，即克去之：如此亦只是終日與聖賢印對，是個純乎天理之心。任他讀書，亦只是調攝此心而已，何累之有？」曰：「雖蒙開示，奈負質庸下，實難免累：竊聞窮通有命，上智之人，恐不屑此不肖為聲利牽纖，甘心為此，徙自苫耳。欲屏棄之，又制於親，不能捨去，奈何？」先生曰：「此事歸辭於親者多矣；其實只是無志。志立得時，良知千事萬事只是一事。讀書作文，安能累人，人自累於得失耳！」因歎曰：「此學不明，不知此處擔擱了幾多英雄漢！」
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阳明先生一番苦心，劝说大家不要为功名所惑，一定不能忘了“良知”。哪怕一开始是为了考试、为了成功而学，只要能有良知，就能去掉急于求成的心，争强好胜的心，强记死读书的心，和一切公里目的的心，从而印证自己本来即存有之天理之心。虽然我们不需要接受陆王心学“天理”、“良知”、“诚意”和“知行合一”等种种理念，却也可以在这真挚的对话中找到些感触吧！提问人实在是太像我们很多人了（当然也包括鄙人）：他觉得自己资质低下，难得消除自己的负担——不像那些出生好的、天资聪明的人，不屑于功名——必须现实的面对科举考试来赢得功名。他觉得自己无助地受到了父母亲人朋友的期望或“约制”——不管是有形的还是无形的——而无法抛弃功利的想法去真正求学。阳明先生的回答甚有道理：我们不能怪罪于父母亲人朋友，而更应该自省，明白问题出在自己身上，是自己没有没有志向！当志向坚定时，心怀良知，无论做什么都是“一事”：此乃不违本心，为己而学，诚意修身，顺道而行之事。先生叹息，“此学不明，不知此处耽搁了几多英雄好汉！”扪心自问，难道这句话不就是针对吾辈现状的肺腑之言吗？鄙人不才，只希望这段话对广大学子们有些帮助。
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03.14.07
Posted in 人文 at 8:53 pm by 若水
Autonomy or Unity—
An Analysis of the Relationships of Li, Creativity, and Heaven in Xunzi with a Brief Comparison to Those in Zhongyong
The School of Xunzi has long been considered heterodox in Chinese Confucian tradition, leaving both the text and its doctrines largely ignored for centuries. This paper shall examine the concepts of li, creativity, and Heaven in the text of Xunzi 荀子to demonstrate the separate and autonomous relationship among the three to illustrate a humanistic school of thought with a sociopolitical realistic aspiration for stability. It shall further compare these relationships to those of Zhongyong 中庸, a text to central the school of Zisi and Mencius, to illustrate a different approach taken by a philosophy that metaphysically unites all three through its defining concept of anthropocosmic unity, 天人合一.
The text of Xunzi closely ties the concept of li禮, translated into “propriety” and sometimes “ritual”, with the notion of learning. In the first chapter of the text, “Encouraging Learning”, Xunzi states that “learning begins with the recitation of the Classics and ends with the reading of the ritual [li 禮] texts; and as to objective, it beings with learning to be a man of breeding, and ends with learning to be a sage”. This statement suggests that as far as the physical act of learning is concerned, the importance of a certain collection of texts that describe li is paramount, even more so than the recitation of Classics. Only after one fluently recites the Classics can he then understands li through reading these texts. In addition, the reading of these texts, i.e. the performance and understanding of li, in terms of its objective, is aligned with “learning to be a sage”. Xunzi, indeed, believes li to be “the great basis of law and the foundation of precedents”. The purpose of li, then, sets a sociopolitical aspiration for learning; “basis of law” and “foundation of precedents” corresponds to legitimacy of politics and social norms, respectively. But at the same time, li fulfills an order that is manifest, but nonetheless beyond mere sociopolitical structures, as evident in the immediately following line from the previous statement: “therefore learning reaches its completion with the rituals, for they may be said to represent the highest point of the Way and its power”. Li completes learning to represent Dao 道, the Confucian way, which encompasses the sociopolitical “basis of law” and “foundation of precedents”, but broadens to include human, natural, and cosmic order all together. As A.S. Cua notes, the concept of li formulates in three stages, first as an idea of rule in the sense of archaic religious rites, then as “a comprehensive notion embracing all social habits and customs acknowledged and accepted as a set of action-guiding rules”, with the third “connected with the notions of right (yi) and reason (li)” to accept as an exemplary rule of conduct for “any rule that is right and reasonable”. Hence, li as sociopolitical ordering affixes to the second stage, while it as a symbol of Dao concerns with the third stage.
Xunzi further discusses li as a force that counters and contains man’s natural, base desires. These desires create tensions between men and generates disorder; to counter these disorder the ancient sage kings created li in order to curb these desires, viz. to allow the appropriate satisfaction to the desires in which neither desire exceeds the necessary condition for satisfaction nor the material good lacking to satisfy the said desire— this process explains the logical sequence from “man is born with desires” to “rites [li] are a means of satisfaction”. Xunzi explains that the concept of li contains a conduct of life with the rightful desires appropriate to sociopolitical order, “therefore, if a man concentrates upon fulfilling ritual principles, then he may satisfy both his human desires and the demands of ritual; but if he concentrates only upon fulfilling his desires, then he will end by satisfying neither”. From here it is evident that Xunzi’s concept of li contains an inner transformative force; the practice of li not only ensures that man fulfills the demand of li, that is, sociopolitical norms necessarily for stability, but also the satisfaction of human desires, as the practice of li standardizes the desire into a normative, balanced set of accepted needs. The transformative li, Xunzi states, has the following three foundations: “Heaven and earth are the basis of life, the ancestors are the basis of the family, and rulers and teachers are the basis of order”. Li, then, roots itself deeply with the birth of humanity, the formulation of family, and sociopolitical order; it is a crucial force that harmonizes the natural institutions of heaven-and-earth, family, and society, through which “Heaven and earth join in in harmony, the sun and moon shine, the four season proceed in order, the stars and constellations march, the rivers flow, and all things flourish”. Hence, not only is this li internally transformative, it also affirms a greater order of natural to be one that both imitates and take part in the maintenance of nature. As a result of this belief to li’s importance in both inner transformation and maintenance of nature, Xunzi’s li, to fulfill its two-fold function, is very minute and detailed to incorporate different aspects of social practices, from the proper dealing with auspicious and inauspicious events to the proper containment and display of one’s emotions. Especially detailed is the li of death: as a connecting force that joins man’s life with nature, death needs the most attention paid by li to maintain this natural order.
Why, then, exists li, this completion of learning, inner-transformative force that corresponds to nature? To Xunzi, this question is closely related to his understanding of human nature, and ultimately will be answered by human creativity. Xunzi shows a rather dim view on such a subject:
Man’s nature is evil; goodness is the result of conscious activity [偽]. The nature of man is such that he is born with a fondness for profit. If he indulges this fondness, it will lead him into wrangling and strife, and all sense of courtesy and humility will disappear. He is born with feelings of envy and hate, and if he indulges these, they will lead him into violence and crime, and all sense f loyalty and good faith will disappear. Man is born with the desires of the eyes and ears, with a fondness for beautiful sights and sounds. If he indulges these, they will lead him into license and wantonness, and all ritual principle and correct forms will be lost. Hence, any man who follows his nature and indulges his emotions will inevitably become involved in wrangling and strive, will violate the forms and rules of society, and will end as a criminal.
Xunzi’s Hobbesian approach to man’s nature requires a solution to inevitable disorder that natural tendencies will cause. Unlike Hobbes who proposes a contractual relationship between man and a powerful sovereign who safeguards his life from others and maintain an external social order, Xunzi promotes the learning of li to internally transform man to become good—“man must first be transformed by the instructions of a teacher and guided by ritual principles, and only then will he be able to observe the dictates of courtesy and humility, obey the forms and rules of society, and achieve order”, with the end product of this learning and adjustment process the flourishing of goodness, “result of conscious activity”.
From this notion of “conscious activity” 偽, then, a further question should be raised on the original origin of li, and of this “conscious activity”—what force contains this notion of creativity to generate these set of principles? Xunzi makes it clear that “all ritual principles are produced by the conscious activity of the sages; essentially they are not products of man’s nature”. The sages, serving as the human par excellence both for their moral authority and their creativity ability, consciously creates li with a clear intension to maintain a form of sociopolitical and natural order. Taking the roles of ideal types of human achievement, these sages represent the collective effort of man to ordain proper order in maintaining the stability of society both internally in terms of interpersonal relationships, and externally in the relationship between man and nature. The creation process of li is completely conscious and artificial; it involves the sages, or humanity’s intelligence and wisdom as generative forces as a reaction to nature rather than a decreed patterning of heaven in the tradition of Zisi and Mencius: “the sage gathers together his thoughts and ideas, experiments with various forms of conscious activity, and so produces ritual principles and set forth laws and regulations”. The gathering of “thoughts and ideas” and “experiments with various forms of conscious activity” marks Xunzi’s notion of human creativity a truly humanistic one; he does not doctrines that govern human behavior as laws or covenants with a personal God, or deliberate patterning to an external force, but instead places human creativity to the center stage to establish his proper place within to maintain society, and without to face nature.
Absent in Xunzi’s philosophy of li, then, is an active role for Heaven 天, the predominant concept of Confucianism in the tradition of Zisi and Mencius. In his “Discussion of Heaven”, Xunzi clearly states that “Heaven’s ways are constant… it does not prevail because of a sage like Yao; it does not cease to prevail because of a tyrant like Chieh”. Xunzi separates man’s action with heaven’s will completely, and hence, removes from his moral philosophy a clear metaphysical connection to Heaven. To Xunzi man’s fortune is up to his own, and a sage is he who can realize this simple fact. However, the passive role of Heaven in human creativity does not eliminate its significance; it is a complete and natural process on its own. Xunzi states, “to bring to completion without acting, to obtain without seeking—this is the work of Heaven”, which a sage does not attempt to imitate. The natural cycle of heaven, with its change of four seasons, transformation of yin and yang, is a complete, godlike process that marks itself an accomplishment. T, Xunzi’s notion of heaven is similar to a modern understanding of nature, beyond man’s control, operating on its own, yet influencing man in its phenomena. Man is bound by heaven only insofar as his action does not oppose the natural order of things, or expect from heaven what is beyond man’s power.
The relationship between li, creativity, and Heaven in Xunzi, then, can be characterized by that of distinction and independently separate, autonomous existence. Li is a product of man, resulted from sages’ conscious activity to function in accordance to Heaven only insofar as its actions do not oppose Heaven’s natural order. Heaven, though its already complete pattern, though influencing li and man’s creativity by the boundary of its natural orders, cannot change or be changed beyond its completion. Human conscious action, or creativity, product of human intellect and wisdom, though the generator of li and an observer of Heaven, does not serve as a unifying force that unites man with Heaven.
Radically opposing Xunzi’s view on li, creativity, and Heaven is that of the school of Zisi and Mencius, as evident in Zhongyong. Instead of perceiving these three as separate, autonomous subjects, Zhongyong offers a holistic anthropocosmic unity that allows close interaction, patterning, and co-creation of the three. First, the concept of li is connected to ren 仁, or humanity:
Benevolence is the characteristic element of humanity [仁], and the great exercise of it is in loving relatives. Righteousness is the accordance of actions with what is right, and the great exercise of it is in honouring the worthy. The decreasing measures of the love due to relatives, and the steps in the honour due to the worthy, are produced by the principle of propriety [禮] [Zhongyong XX.5].
Humanity, in turn, is further associated with the Zhongyong concept of creativity, known as co-creativity, cheng 誠, sometimes translated into sincerity:
The possessor of sincerity [誠] does not merely accomplish the self-completion of himself. With this quality he completes other men and things also. The completing himself shows his perfect virtue [仁]. The completing other men and things show his knowledge. Both these are virtues belonging to the nature, and this is the way by which a union is effected of the external and internal. Theserefore, whever he—the entirely sincere man—employs them, –that is, these virtues, –their action will be right [Zhongyong XXV.3].
Cheng is best represented by the term co-creativity because it is the force that creates a metaphysics of morals for Zhongyong, that which connects man with heaven as co-creators in a cosmology characterized by anthropocosmic unity, 天人合一:
It is only the individual possessed of the most entire sincerity [誠] that can exist under heaven [天], who can adjust the great invariable relations of mankind, establish the great fundamental virtues of humanity, and know the transforming and nurturning operations of Heaven and Earth; –shall this individual have any being or anything beyond himself on which he depends? Call him man in his ideal [仁], how earnest he is! Call him an abyss, how deep is he! Call him Heaven [天], how vast is he! [XXXII.1-2].
In the cosmology of Zhongyong, then, the concepts of li, creativity, and Heaven are connected by an individual, a possessor of co-creativity cheng 誠, that Tu Weiming describes as a “profound person” whom, “through a long and unceasing process of delving into his own ground of existence, discovers his true subjectivity not as an isolated selfhood but as a great source of creative transformation”. This profound person, through his realization of heaven’s pattern and his role as a co-creator, does not create through his intelligence, but transmits through the pattern of heaven, the proper governance of action, li, as a spontaneous act from his inner humanity, ren 仁. Hence, through this active process of co-creativity, anthropocosmic unity 天人合一 is achieved.
An analogy of the cosmology of Xunzi and that of Zhongyong, then, presents two radically different approaches to the relationships between li, creativity, and Heaven. But perhaps these differences can be explained in terms of basic approaches by these two distinct schools of Confucianism. The school of Xunzi starts from a sociopolitical realistic perspective that, through realization of the baseness of human nature and man’s instinctual desires, seeks to create sociopolitical order through deliberate human creativity, conscious action 偽, to generate a set of conduct known as li from human intelligence and wisdom. The li is to be the completion of learning, which the man, with his base nature, ought to ceaselessly pursue to attain the good. Heaven plays no active role to the sociopolitical realist, who only wishes man not to disrupt its natural orders to create further chaos. Man’s role in Xunzi’s system serves as an intelligent and autonomous creator, who at the same time attempts to tame his nature through following the li of sages. Ultimately, each of the three concepts is distinct and autonomous, with no single unifying factor. Zhongyong, on the other hand, starts from a philosophical and optimistic approach to human nature, assuming its natural capacity for humanity, ren 仁, and allows a profound person to unify all three through his realization of cheng 誠, his capacity and duty of co-creativity. The process of this unification is man’s internal growth to the realization of 仁 through self-cultivation. Li is the natural external manifestation of this realization, rather than a process of normative learning of the good; it is patterned after man’s understanding of Heaven, as man acts in accordance to Heaven’s will. Although man in both of these texts assume this role of the creator, they are nonetheless different: while he who follows the school of Xunzi realizes and creates artifice through conscious action, 偽, the profound man interacts with Heaven to pattern with sincerity, 誠.
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03.12.07
Posted in 人文 at 3:23 am by 若水
Critique of Max Weber’s Religion of Chian
Upon completion of the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Max Weber initiated a project to answer this question: why has modern capitalism only emerged in the western world? Or, more specifically, what qualities of the protestant ethic, i.e. puritan ethic, marked its difference with those of other major traditions to solely allow a western emergence of the spirit of capitalism? This project explains the structure and content of his Religion of China; examining Confucianism and Taoism from the particular cultural-historical background of China, Weber concludes that divergent historical development results primarily from ethical, rather than political-economic differences. This difference does not emerge from either religion’s lack of rationalism, which, as Weber states, “To judge the level of rationalization a religion represents we may use two primary yardsticks which are in many ways interrelated. One is the degree to which the religion has divested itself of magic; the other is the degree to which it has systematically unified the relation between God and the world and therewith its own ethical relationships to the world”. Both of these qualities, as presented in the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, manifest in the Protestant religion. Confucianism on the other hand achieves the same level of rationalism by these two standards; it eschews magic as Confucius seldom speaks about “prodigies, magic powers, disorder and spirits”, and it insists “that Heaven is the ultimate source of human virtues, that the Mandate of Heaven can be known through one’s conscious search in one’s nature and/or in the natural and human world, and that fulfillment of Heaven’s Mandate is nothing other than undertaking self-cultivation and extending one’s virtues to others and to the world”. Yet the two types of developed rationalism mutually exclude one another, resulting in two different historical developments. Confucianism forms a rational adjustment rather than Protestantism’s rational mastery of the world. That is to say, through adjustment Confucianism becomes a force of traditionalism that impedes the rationalistic development of capitalism. This paper shall closely analyze Weberian perception of Confucianism and Protestantism’s divergences in rationalization in terms of their perception of salvation, which creates a tension between the supra-mundane and the mundane, asceticism, and, taking into consideration their respective political-historical development, life-aspirations. Then, it shall critique the Weberian understanding of Chinese Confucianism, noting his misconceptions of elements supposedly lacking in the said religion, to conclude that although Weber successfully observes Confucianism’s lack of development for capitalist mentality, he fails to perceive the reason for such absence.
The concept of salvation, present in Protestantism and absent in Weberian conception of Confucianism, shall be the first point of comparison. The concept of salvation is pivotal to the Protestant religion; it places a goal distant and separate from life that essentially checks one’s behavior in life; a subject faces two choices, viz. the morally upright life or eternal condemnation. This choice results from a “contrast between ‘god’ or ‘nature’ and ‘statutory law’ or ‘convention’”. That is to say, a dichotomy of the supra-mundane and the mundane is established, with the vision of the former closely monitoring the ethics of the latter. It is through this separation, along with the rationalization of a worldly asceticism that the protestant ethic evolves into the spirit of capitalism. However, as Weber notes, the Christian concept of salvation is absent in the Confucian tradition—“a conflict in the Christian manner between the interest in the salvation of one’s soul and the demands of the natural social order was inconceivable”. Instead of focusing one’s attention to a distant, supra-mundane reality, the Confucian is “saved” from “barbaric lack of education”. The Confucian ethics considers this worldly life of paramount importance and seeks improvement with education solely within the scope of a conceivable, natural life. Weber comprehends it as a “system of radical worldly optimism [that] succeeded in removing the basic pessimistic tension between the world and the supra-mundane destination of the individual”. Because it lacks “any tension between nature and deity, between ethical demand and human shortcoming, consciousness of sin and need for salvation, conduct on earth and comprehension in the beyond, religious duty and sociopolitical reality”, Confucianism cannot support “conduct through inner forces freed of tradition and convention”. Whereas the existence of such tension creates man’s forceful adjustment of the world, taken as material, to his internal ideas, the lack thereof, as manifested in the case of Confucianism, harmonizes to adjust “to the outside, to the conditions of the ‘world’”, producing a “style of life… characterized by essentially negative traits”. Indeed, Weber sees Confucian rationalism a process that deters man from forming a “unified personality” which is “a whole placed methodically under a transcendental goal”. Hence, the Weberian perception of Confucianism is one that lacks any touch of divinity; without transcendence, manifested in the tension between the supra-mundane and the mundane, without salvation, it imprisons souls to a world of traditions and conventions. This world, in addition, is one of inter-human relations, bound by propriety, without duties to a supra-human divinity, or even a sense of abstract community. A person is to sustain his five relationships with his lord, his father, his brothers, his wife, and his friends in harmony, fulfilling a personist principle, “undoubtedly as great a barrier to impersonal rationalization as it was generally to impersonal matter of factness”. Hence, lacking the concept of salvation serves as the first great obstacle for Confucian ethic to advance to a spirit of capitalism. However, missing also in the Confucian tradition is the notion of asceticism, whose worldly form plays a catalyst in the transformation of the Protestant ethic into the spirit of capitalism.
Asceticism, evident in the Protestant ethics, produces a “relentlessly and religiously systematized utilitarianism… to live “in” the world and yet not be ‘of’ it”, which creates “superior rational aptitude and therewith the spirit of the vocational man, which… was denied to Confucianism”. On the contrary, the Confucian way of life, though rational, is “determined, unlike Puritanism, from without rather than from within”, resulting in “mere sobriety and thriftiness combined with acquisitiveness and regard for wealth… far from representing and far from releasing the ‘capitalist spirit,’ in the sense that this is found in the vocational man of the modern economy”. According to Weber, “asceticism and contemplation, mortification and escape from the world were not only unknown in Confucianism but were despised as parasitism”. As a result, the Confucian never engages in the Puritan—Protestant par excellence—form of “rationalism”, of which “the typical Puritan earned plenty, spent little, and reinvested his income as capital in rational capitalist enterprise out of an asceticist compulsion to save”. Instead, “the typical Confucian used his own and his family’s savings in order to acquire a literary education and to have himself trained for the examinations… thus he gained the basis for a cultured status position”. Therefore, the Confucian ethic sans ascetic element produces a kind of contradiction that drives one into fame rather than capitalist enterprises; he lacks the transcendental, ascetic goal of the Puritan, “the true Christian, the other-worldly and inner-worldly asceticist, [who] wishes to be nothing more than a tool of his God”. While the Confucian sought worldly pursuits, no great economic accumulation results; while the Puritan eschews the very same pursuit, the spirit of capitalism begets. The result from the lack of salvation and asceticism in Confucian doctrines embedded in the particular historical development of an early patrimonial imperial bureaucracy creates a society with life-aspiration focused on status, manifests in a privileged literati class with prestige in officialdom as its highest aspirations in life.
The patrimonial system trains a “superior man” mastered in the art of propriety who both opposes commercial activities and seeks personal gains in office, and who opposes useful training of a socially useful man and seeks self-cultivation through learning. In short, he is expected to become a moral man, not a Puritan individual who seeks his own salvation and engages in worldly asceticism from his sense of duty, of calling from God; however, his very focus on worldly morality produces a fortune-hunter without real spiritual guidance. On one hand, the Confucian opposes commercial activities, which Confucius denounces to be those of profit and unsuitable for a superior man. He further separates himself from the Protestant ideal of one who becomes a tool; instead, “the fundamental assertion, ‘a cultured man is not a tool’ meant that he was an end in himself and not just a means for a specified useful purpose”. On the other hand, the only way for a Confucian to prove himself a “cultured man” or “superior man” is through the gaining of official position through various examination systems; he has no God to reaffirm his inner value—only societal recognition would serve the purpose. In addition, because the Confucian generates “an absolutely agnostic and essentially negative mood opposed to all hopes for a beyond”, he places his “’messianic’ hope for a this-worldly Savior-Emperor” and employs himself to be an official, an aide, to that glorified individual. As Weber observes, the Confucian goes as far as “deifying ‘wealth’” and engages in unlawful activities of acquiring wealth in the short terms of his office, while at the same time show condescendence to merchants and profiteering. The Confucian, because of his worldly aspirations in life, engages in adjustment to vanity fair, acknowledging wealth while surrendering to enjoyment. The resulting ethic from this aspiration, along with the previously stated absence of salvation and asceticism, is a rationalism of adjustment that opposes the mentality of capitalism. Further, Confucianism does not lead to any formulations of newer ethics as it necessarily supports and reinforces its current, patrimonial system, as its “reason” is a “rationalism of order” essentially “pacifist in nature”. Hence, in drawing these various differences Confucian ethic hold from protestant ethic, Weber postulates a possible explanation to a historical fact: while modern spirit of capitalism emerged in the west through rationalization of the protestant ethic, its impossibility of development in China can be partially a result of a stagnant Confucian ethics.
This paper, then, has compared Weber’s notion of Confucianism with Protestantism as an attempt to explain China’s lack of capitalist mentality in his Religion of China. Although Weber quite accurately describes the economic-historical reality of China’s lack of capitalist, and also its lack of capitalist mentality (“spirit of capitalism”), and perhaps too these realities are partially in fact caused by an impeding force of Confucianism, his understanding of Confucianism in many areas are Eurocentric and erroneous. Confucianism, contrary to Weberian understanding, not only has an ascetic element and a spiritually inspired life-aspiration, but also an acknowledgement of supra-mundane reality, that is, a salvation of a kind. However, true to its western lineage, while the Weberian description of a capitalist-mentality-generating ethic requires a dichotomy, a contradiction, or a “tension” between supra-mundane and the mundane world, the Confucian model by its own light disregards these tensions as unnatural and seeks to harmonize opposing forces. Weber, indeed, is very correct in stating that “Confucian rationalism meant rational adjustment to the world; Puritan rationalism meant rational mastery of the world”. But this difference cannot be used as a value-judgmental basis to apologize for Confucianism’s lack of development. Indeed, Confucianism never developed a spirit of capitalism because such a notion takes no place in Confucian spirituality; it is simply unnecessary. The Religion of China ultimately fails to comprehend Confucian ethics and its negligence of capitalistic development because its approach, similar to its subject of Protestantism, is itself a product of western rationalism that requires and focuses on various “tensions”, or individual parts that serve utilitarian purposes, rather than that of a holistic philosophy.
To properly understand Confucianism, especially its heavy emphasis on the world here and now, one has to first attempt an understanding of its basic weltanschauung. A key concept, anthropocosmic unity, ought to be explained prior to the discussion of Confucian asceticism, life-aspiration, and ultimately, harmony between the supra-mundane and the mundane world. Anthropocosmic unity, or “unity between heaven and man” (tianrenheyi), “has been generally regarded a feature uniquely characteristic of Chinese religious and philosophical imagination”. In Confucian belief there always exists a concept of heaven (tian) that, contrary to Weber’s notion that it completely lacks metaphysics, are at least omniscient and omnipresent, though not necessarily omnipotent. Chinese emperors called themselves “sons of heavens” as direct inheritors of the will of heaven; the concept of “mandate of heaven” is further used to justify the transition of dynasties. This heaven is omnipresent because everything on earth is encompassed in heaven; it is omniscient because heaven and human form a co-operative relationship in seeing, hearing, and adjusting to the environment. However, unlike the Protestant God, Heaven assumes not the sole power of creation, and hence, not omnipotent. It is through this distinction that the Confucian heaven doesn’t stand as a force completely separate from man, and allows a different type of transcendence which enables man to become a co-creator with heaven. Ying-Shi Yü, following the tradition of Karl Jaspers, notices that during a period known as “Axial breakthrough” different religious traditions “led directly to the emergence of the dichotomy between the actual world and the world beyond”, which “essentially what transcendence is all about: the actual world is transcended but not negated”. Confucian transcendence, however, does not fully qualify this condition: “In the Chinese breakthrough, the two worlds, actual and transcendental, do not appear to have been sharply divided”.. The result is a tradition that focuses on an “inward transcendence” through the notion of anthropocosmic unity (tianrenheyi), one which links the “two worlds, actual and transcendental… by the purified mind/heart in a way ‘neither identical nor separate’”. Yü distinguishes the Confucian transcendence from the west: “The Chinese transcendental world is not systematically externalized, formalized, or objectified… After the Axial breakthrough, Chinese thinkers tended not to apply their imaginative powers to nature, shape, characteristics, and so on of the world beyond… This Chinese attitude contrasts sharply with the Western predilection to imagine, often vividly and profusely, about the world beyond with the aid of speculative reason”. The path to this anthropocosmic unity, undoubtedly, is self-cultivation; the Confucian thrives for “the quest for sagehood”, as Julia Ching says, “the heart of Confucianism”. Without an understanding of anthropocosmic unity, this quest indeed would seem Weberian Confucian and worldly in nature; however, with proper understanding, this quest is now a Confucian’s path to become united with Heaven, to find inner transcendence, to work his own salvation in this world, but nonetheless retain an understanding of the greater world of Heaven.
Similar to the concept of salvation, those of asceticism and life-aspiration also exist for Confucianism. Ching notices that important concepts of “self-conquest” (keji) for “restoring propriety” (fuli) are found in Confucian Analects. It is a process of continuous self-examination which Neo-Confucians used to keep “spiritual account” of themselves. This asceticism, however, “remained a disciple of moderation, which did not inspire any flight into deserts or produce any monastic movement. The Confcuian teaching was to control one’s passions, not to live as if one were without them. Besides, Confucian asceticism was always practiced for the sake of a higher goal: that of rendering the individual more humane for others, in the service of a larger group, namely, the family and the society”. Confucianism also contains life-aspirations beyond office-seeking of the literati class, as Weber suggests. Earlier in the paper it is already stated that the Confucian seeks sagehood and anthropocosmic unity as his life-long goal. It is perhaps more lucid to term the Confucian life-aspiration one of “holistic humanism”. Drawing from the opening lines of Great Learning, Confucian scholar Tu Weiming notes that Confucian ethic is one of humanism, in the sense that it emphasizes on the human ability of self-transformation and self-cultivation, and one of holism because it perceives one’s conduct of self, family, state, and all-under-heaven (tianxia) as inseparable parts of an expending concentric circle, with “self” serving as its inner core. Indeed, “for Confucianism, life is [] a process of continuous self-cultivation and self-transformation leading to self-transcendence, the realization of one’s authentic nature in which the all-pervasive principle of Heaven are fully manifested”.
Since Confucianism contains asceticism, life-aspiration, and salvation, why does it lack seeds to the capitalist mentality? Weberian observation of the socioeconomic reality results from fundamental Confucian disregard of tension for the sake of harmony, or he. The asceticism described above is to be distinguished from the Puritan asceticism, which relies on a contradictory tension between service to God and accumulation of capital. The fundamental approach to Confucian asceticism—harmony through moderation—eliminates an asceticism of tension; a Confucian would find the Puritan model unnatural. Evident in Confucianism is its life-aspiration, but this, too, lacks a notion of “tension” that the protestant model relies. Whereas the Protestant ethic creates a life-aspiration through calling of God to become “nothing more than a tool of his God, in [which] he thought his destiny”, the Confucian would see this tension between God and man, or master and his tool, as a disruption of the cosmic harmony. Indeed, while the Protestant man sets to master the nature entrusted by God, the Confucian lives with the nature, a part of the heaven with whom he unites. Fundamentally, it is the Confucian salvation, a complete internal process of self-cultivation and inner transcendence, which renders capitalist mentality indifferent to him. The capitalist mentality, as Weber describes, results from the rationalization of a tension between asceticism and fulfilling God’s will for material production; the Confucian rationalization of inner transcendence, asceticism without monasticism, and life-aspiration of holistic humanism, does not need a capitalist mentality to serve its will. The quest for sagehood does not need material and economic manifestations. The office-seeking mentality and profiteering of officeholders observed by Weber are but deviants to the appropriate interpretation of the Confucian tradition—similar deviations exist in other traditions as well. These deviations should not be used to judge the normative ethic of the Confucian life-aspiration.
At this point, though, it is necessary to consider Weber’s approach to Religion of China itself; key to his theory is the concept of “rationalization”, which is the process of tension between every religion’s rational, ethical imperative with irrationalities, or traditions of the world. Confucianism abandons possible tensions for harmony; to judge it in terms of a theory based on fundamental tension perhaps dwarfs its true light. For a Confucian, rationalization of his self-cultivation and quest for anthropocosmic unity signifies moral bankruptcy and justification for politico-economic gains of vanity. Such a process cannot be accepted by a tradition that never separates facts from morality, or, human from his perception of heaven. In conclusion, the Weberian analysis in Religion of China materializes a convincing argument to explain China’s lack of development in capitalist mentality from Confucian ethic. However, Weber fails to locate the real cause of such absence s a result of his inability to perceive Confucianism beyond a Eurocentric, rationalist perspective. In order to understand Confucianism and its necessary, deliberate rejection of capitalist mentality, it is imperative to understand Confucianism as an anthropocosmic tradition that discards dichotomy of tensions for harmony of coexistence.
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02.22.07
Posted in 人文 at 1:28 am by 若水
取自《荀子·性恶》：
人之性恶，其善者伪也。今人之性，生而有好利焉，顺是，故争夺生而辞让亡焉；生而有疾恶焉，顺是，故残贼生而忠信亡焉；生而有耳目之欲，有好声色焉，顺是，故淫乱生而礼义文理亡焉。
问者曰：“人之性恶，则礼义恶生？”
应之曰：凡礼义者，是生于圣人之伪，非故生于人之性也。故陶人埏埴而为器，然则器生于陶人之伪，非故生于人之性也。故工人斲木而成器，然则器生于工人 之伪，非故生于人之性也。圣人积思虑，习伪故，以生礼义而起法度，然则礼义法度者，是生于圣人之伪，非故生于人之性也。若夫目好色，耳好听，口好味，心好 利，骨体肤理好愉佚，是皆生于人之情性者也；感而自然，不待事而后生之者也。夫感而不能然，必且待事而后然者，谓之生于伪。是性伪之所生，其不同之征也。
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由此可见，据荀况所言人之自然本性为“恶”，而“善”乃人为（写作“伪”）之结果。与孟子不同，荀子可谓是一位政治现实主义者，尖锐地指出“今人之性，生而有好利焉”。也就是说，人生来既有诸多不良欲望及本能；他贪婪、自私：顺其本性而行则社会动荡，礼崩乐坏。对于这样的社会，只用礼义教化才能使其稳定。故荀况现实地劝学、倡修身、尚礼，以求一和平稳定之社会。值得提出的是此系统存在一关键问题：在性恶论下，何为一个体求学、修身、从礼之基本动机？也就是说，此“自我提升”之行动是自主（autonomous）的还是他律的（heteronomous）？尚礼此举呈现为一被动性行为；个体所做的仅仅是对现存之礼节之模仿，并无自主性创造过程。如愿定义荀子修身为自主性的，我们必须搞清楚其礼义之源。荀子曰：“凡礼义者，是生于圣人之伪，非故生于人之性也。”由此可见礼义是人工的、并不是自然的。“圣人积思虑，习伪故，以生礼义而起法度”：就是说，圣人是通过思考和试验而创造出最为适应社会之礼义的。礼义的最初点为人之社会创造性，实际上是一种社会模式之体现。与孟子之礼不同，荀子之礼是人造的，与天绝缘的。但是我们的问题尚未解决：没有了“天”作为一定义性之自发、自主性创造体为礼义之源，我们无法确定何为圣人之伪，无法知道它是否是自发的、自主的，还是受文化社会自然而他律的。无论如何，值得肯定的是荀子以恶为人之本性，尚礼而求稳定和谐之社会，为政治现实主义、广义性的人文主义之先驱。
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02.21.07
Posted in 人文 at 2:39 am by 若水
前几日在James Russell教授家做客时不知为何提到了上学期上过的存在主义小说这门课。教授听了就笑了起来，进房里拿了本书出来，为Delmore Schwartz所作, 并在其中读到了”Existentialism: the Inside Story”这篇杂文。作者风趣地指出，存在主义与其余的主义，诸如犬儒主义、乐观主义、超现实主义、酒精中毒（原文为alcoholism, 也带了”-ism”这个象征“主义”的后缀）一样，成了一常见的闲聊主题。作者有意复兴存在主义，并把它定义为以下的公式：存在主义即是说，没有任何的别人能代替你来泡澡。Schwartz解释道，“就如海德格尔所说一样，没有任何的别人能代替你死亡”。泡澡比死亡更能体现出存在主义的精髓因为死亡每人只能经历一次，而且人还不时地刻意使自己忘记它的必然性——并且，无论它怎么令人厌恶和必然，它总是遥远的；而泡澡则是每人——起码在还算富裕的资本主义社会的每个人——每天都必须面对的事实。既然每天都得泡澡和花时间去想是否需要泡澡，还不如同时想想存在主义的价值。否则，你可能会想到自己：而这么做就陷入了自恋的圈套；或者，你可能会想到别人，不过除非你心情好你大概是在想自己怎么害人。当然，你也可能什么也没想：不过那样则更是无意义，完全是浪费时间！所以，朋友们，如果你要去泡澡的话，应该马上联想到存在主义。你所做的是一个重要的，存在性的决定！当然，如果你要冥想存在主义的奥妙的话，不如直接去泡澡。
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02.20.07
Posted in 人文 at 7:56 am by 若水
自由主义可以代表很多层意义：左派的、右派的、集权的、无政府的，都用过“自由主义”来代表其特征。三民主义的根源也来自于一普遍的“自由主义”概念。如此说来每个不同的“主义”者都有自己的“自由主义”，就好像每个人都有自己的睡衣一样：疲惫困了的时候就换上它，表现出一副想睡觉了的样子，显得自己很贴近生活的本质。毋宁多言，我也来简短的说说我的“自由主义”：
1. 每个人要有自己抱怨的权利：这个是基本——没法抱怨自己的自由受到了某某政府、某某特权阶级、某种性别的歧视或压迫哪还有自由主义的发展空间？
2. 在自己的世界观或思考模式与别人不同时，要提供空气啊、食物啊、等等必须品给那些与自己“不太一样的人”：注意——必须是由个人或个人所代表的团体、主义提供给不同的人，因为只有这样才能显示出自由主义的慷慨。就是说，我必须在一个能提供、高端的角度上才能以同情之心来体谅那些不一样的可怜虫们，这样他们才能履行自由主义的第一条——抱怨。
3. 不管想不想听别人讲话，一定要装作想听：这是基本，否则大家知道了自己讲话啊、上书啊什么的没用这个主义的架子由谁来担啊。
4. 不管是否真的尊重别人，一定要装作尊重，把不同的人们当爷们看，并且同时用一些好听的词汇来代替对他们的贬义称呼：就是说，这个年代不能管白痴叫白痴，一定得管他们叫“智力受到了一定挑战”的同志们。
5. 不要讨论自由主义！注意：讨论了就没法真正“自由”了，因为这样我们的讨论话题就被限制在了“自由”这一点，从而违背了自由。
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02.16.07
Posted in 人文 at 7:49 pm by 若水
前两日和朋友不知为何谈到了宗教的问题。她认为，宗教是一种个人的精神寄托而存在的，而它的起源则是人对于自然不了解却又想了解的求知心之产物。而我则持反对态度。当然，这可能只是一种定义问题：就我所见，有必要将“信仰”和“宗教”这两个概念划分开来。首先，“信仰”确实是可以作为一种“精神寄托”而一言概之；终究来说只有个人的意识是可以决定信仰的。它代表着一个人对于一种宗教，一种哲学，或者说任何一种无形的或者有形的概念、精神犹自内心的相信：也就是说，就如杜维明先生所说的，信仰是由人的意志来决定的，是可以超越现实限制的一种主体性选择。好比说，一个人可以在任何时候决定成为一个基督徒、一个穆斯林、甚至一个社会主义者、理想主义者：只要他相信，他已经是一个诚恳的信徒了。相比之下，“宗教”此概念却不应只是与个人有关联的；准确地说，宗教更应该是一种社会现象，或者一个社会机制；它的起源是基于一个团体、一个部族的。杜尔凯姆在研究澳洲土著部落时发现，其部落宗教，作为原始性的宗教，最根本的基础是其团体性：宗教通过了某些掌握神权的个体或机制使整个部族能通过一种特定的物体或信念，并通过宗教仪式的形式来将“神圣”和“亵渎”之个体以及事物区分开来，从而达到了一种促使这一社会团体运作的结果。这个掌握神权的个体或机制则代表了宗教的权威：他们用力量或说服力使信徒相信他们是人与超自然的“神”或“天”的连接，并往往在原始时期集政治权威于一体。同一宗教的信徒通过共同的宗教仪式和对宗教权威共同的信服来达到了一种社会团结性。就是说，宗教是一种社会机构。它的起源是社会形态形成本身，而并不是对自然的好奇所产生的求知性创造。后者固然重要：但是从社会的角度来看它只成为了一种被宗教权威所利用的工具。通过力量或说服力，权威利用人的求知心而达成了自己的宗教控制，造就了一种拥有制度、等级、能运作的社会。那么，既然宗教来自于社会，它也会回归与社会。杜尔凯姆认为社会发展到了一定程度，能达到“有机团结性”时，社会自己即可代替宗教的价值，给予它一个正常社会应有的功能。这样就可以理解为何在一真正的共产主义社会宗教是没有存在必要的：共产主义自身就已经能做到宗教的功能，通过自己的机制为社会带来稳定性、精神支柱、和团体性，故代替了宗教而成为了终极的宗教：社会。
不过话说回来了，既然宗教仅是一种社会机制，那么信仰呢？它可否可以和宗教分开并独立存在？我相信——不，我坚信这是可能的。在斯大林统治的苏联，那些列宁格勒的诗人、艺术家、创造者们，不懈与国家、与意识形态、与作为宗教的共产主义作对，为了表达自己不朽的创造精神不就是这种信仰存在最好的证明吗？在他们无声的怒吼、哀悼中，信仰屹立在了宗教之上：而贯穿其中的则是人性，像亚特拉斯搬撑起了我们的世界。
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02.13.07
Posted in 人文 at 12:01 am by 若水
今天课堂讨论时田晓菲教授提出了一个看似简单的问题：自然与社会而者作为概念来说的前后关系是什么？最直观的答案是先有自然后有社会：从历史的角度来说社会是建立在自然的基础之上的，人类是在自然中建立起团体氏族、最终进化成社会的。但是，从“概念”的角度来说，自然确是在有了社会后才存在的。原本并没有什么社会与自然的区别；只有在“社会”的概念出现之后，人才有可能拿一“社会之外”的概念作为比较，并称之为“自然”。也就是说，我们概念中的“自然”亦非自然，仅仅是我们自己对比和创造出之人工概念而已。
这种“社会”与“自然”的对比可见于文艺复兴左右的欧洲文学和思想界。当时的欧洲思想界，作为“社会”的代表，已古文明为基础假象出了一个所谓的“自然状态”，名曰人类之“黄金时代”，并试图在其余非西方文明中找到能代表这种“自然状态”的例子。与主流思潮相仿，蒙田在其随笔中写到了对印第安文明作为“自然野人”的种种经过理想化之事迹。莎翁亦在《暴风雨》中发表了类似看法。
对于文学来说，此对比印证了“复杂”与“朴素”此二概念之关系。只有在与前者的对比下后者的概念才能产生。陆机的拟古诗十九首与原本的古诗十九首相比为刻意复杂化的作品。但是它作为“复杂”的概念却得早于古诗十九首“朴素”的概念。有了前者才能有后者。
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