十年 Decennis

胡爷爷现在很头疼. 这个事情怎么会搞成如此. 党开始寻求公关公司来紧急解决火炬问题, 这在以前是不可想象的. 其实仔细阅读包括纽约时报, 金融时报, 华盛顿邮报, 法新社, BBC等左、右派媒体机构报道的评论, 可以看到, 与一些新闻机构偏袒的报道对比, 多数人还是能够以公正的眼光来审视这件事的. 而不停地在攻击中国的, 恰恰就是这些媒体机构为主而已.

我不否认以前中国完全是用暴力打下西藏的. 但是每一个国家和部落的进化都是有这样一个过程的. 更何况中华民族在小农经济的地缘政治的影响下, 长久以来形成了”温良”的民族性格, 长达千年的历史中, 在中华民族强盛之时, 与外族相处无事, 并不因自身的强大而去侵略或攻占周遍邻邦. 而中国的几次侵占, 恰恰都是在以游牧经济为地缘政治核心的西方民族的侵略下的反击, 或是在西方思想主导的世界中的规则遵循.

而在近60年后的今天, 西藏仍然是个复杂的地方. 不管是自己决定还是受周围人的怂恿, 是达赖, 首先言而无信, 背弃了他所签定的协议. 尽管很多事情与达赖没有太多干系, 但是作为西藏的精神领袖和协议的签定者, 是达赖的责任来背负这所有的一切. 而西方国家在自己发达后, 希望在人间保留的纯洁和干净的乐土, 自然也就会想到西藏. 应该说, 由于中国内部政治原因, 西藏确实得以保持了几十年的不变. 但是, 随着中国经济的腾飞, 政府开始更多地关注西部的开发, 促进人们的生活水平. 应该说, 政府确实在处理一些政治问题上有过激的程度, 但是政府是在不断学习和吸取经验教训中前进, 而且保持政治的集中以推动经济的快速发展, 然后再从基层开始进行政治改革的思路确实是最适合中国国情的. 而当整个世界都在进步的时候, 西藏又怎能坐井观天止步不前? 可悲的是, 西藏没有意识到, 很多所谓保护西藏的团体和国家, 也许只是抱着一种”看动物园”的想法罢了.

现在, 代表了人类”团结,奋斗,进取”的奥运”圣”火, 在传递. 也许中国是在传递着骄傲, 但是更多的, 是友好. 奥林匹克, 是各个国家的人民, 和运动员, 共同的节日. 而西藏, 竟然想用奥运会来争取自己的独立. 抛开别的不谈, 他们有什么权利剥夺这几千几万名运动员4年的努力.

今天, 在法国这个左手举着”自由, 平等, 博爱”, 右手举着刺刀大炮的国家, 又一次上演了以”和平和民主”为名义的暴力. 法兰西所标榜和保护的法式文化, 难道就一定要用暴力来解决问题? 我不反对游行, 但是不能因为自己利益的游行而损害别人, 尤其是大多数人的利益. 就像伏尔泰所说, 也许我们不同意他们所说的每一个字, 但是我们誓死捍卫他们说话的权利. 但是, 他们不能把说话的权利转变成暴力的权利.

更何况, 今天他们殴打的, 是一个身有残疾的女孩子!

http://2008.sohu.com/20080408/n256159713.shtml

http://v.youku.com/v_show/id_co00XMTI5MTc2NDA=.html
一个心志正常的人, 怎么能对这样一个像天使一样美丽的女孩子下得去手?! 这样美丽的女孩, 和她身后护送她前进的盲人, 组成的, 分明是人世间最美好最圣洁的事物. 而口口声声”自由, 民主, 博爱”的人们, 到底都在做些什么!

我原本比较担心火炬去新德里的情况, 但现在我觉得, 不管国际奥委会在15号做出什么决定, 我们都应该把火炬送到新德里, 这才是真正的奥运精神.

也许就像那句评论所说, “善良的佛如果看到这些, 是会让他们下地狱的”.

P.S. 大家转一转这个女孩子的联接. 现在是中国人应该团结在一起的时候. 所有中国人团结起来的媒体力量会远远超过这几家舆论.

霍克海默与阿尔多诺的名作《启蒙辩证法》(the Dialectic of Enlightenment)代表了法兰克福学派对启蒙运动及受其深厚影响的现代社会之批判。法兰克福学派作为西方马克思主义的代表在欧陆战争后与第三国际式的马列主义分道扬镳。作为一个放弃了直接暴力革命与无产阶级独裁的学派而言，法兰克福学派亦没有走向伯恩斯坦所代表的康德式修正主义，而是从学术的立场在肯定革命的必要性下（本雅明认为革命是一种末世性的救赎，而阿尔多诺则认为它是一个有取向性的憧憬）冷眼观察和批判工业化、都市化、和机械化的现代社会。但法兰克福学派的诸位却又不甘于只做学术，认为思想和行动是不可分开的，以“批判理论”此名来形容他们对社会实践其思想的理念。

霍克海默和阿尔多诺认为启蒙运动归根结底来说是失败的。启蒙运动代表了魔法社会（玛娜）与科学社会的分界线。科学社会的根本理论是工具理性：其宗旨是把所有的事物和关联性都减小为最低限度的形成体，进行测量，并将其作为工具以用之。而不能被简化为最低限度形成体的现象则被忽略。社会的单位变为了个体：架于个体之上的总体性社会现象则就此失去了意义。在其客观性了解世界的同时，启蒙理性物化了世界。个体虽然存在，却无法保留其主体性；集体虽然存在，却无法解释集体行动（praxis）：启蒙理性是无法从主观和相对的角度出发来了解世界的。启蒙辩证法的目的就是在于通过辩证法来说明启蒙理性的种种问题。在霍克海默和阿尔多诺眼里，启蒙运动所带来的科学性思想最终导致了社会对个人的压迫甚至法西斯主义。

《启蒙辩证法》选择了《奥德赛》中的主人公奥德修斯来代表启蒙理性的锥形。霍克海默和阿尔多诺提到，奥德修斯可以在其本人不在的二十年时一样让其王国正常运行。牧户和佃户照常工作，王后虽然名义上代表了王权却并没有执行任何权力——这就是理性的力量。而另一方面，奥德修斯对与其飘扬地中海的士兵水手的控制也是绝对的。面对海妖歌声的诱惑，奥德修斯命令其手下堵住耳朵，不受影响。而对于自己他的要求则相反。作为启蒙理性的代理人他需要对证明和享受自己权力带来的果实：所以他要受到诱惑，要享受海妖的歌声。但同时启蒙理性的代言人却不是自由的。他在定义自己的权力时已经放弃了自己的主体性，所以他必须要通过工具理性来“控制”非理性的部分——欲望。所以他要求部下把自己绑在桅杆上，直到船离开海妖所在的领域为止。那末，奥德修斯在遭遇海妖的过程中就充分体现了启蒙理性的弊病。一方面其根本是控制，另一方面其本质是压抑。在奥德修斯听到海妖歌声却不能离开的狂喜和痛苦中，代表启蒙运动的工具理性已经在人类最早的记载中展现了身影。

诚然，霍克海默和阿尔多诺的比喻并非完全合理。将一近代现象追溯到远古史诗时代本身就是一种忽略了历史性特征的做法。而且奥德修斯作为一英雄人物其本身既是大于凡人的；他的英雄式意志并不能和普世性的启蒙理性相比。作为一个多元性的个体（polutropon/ man of many turns），奥德修斯并不是一个只有理性和运用理性去看待世界的。他并不只把一切事物都简化成可以测量和控制的变量，而是保有了一个更全面的世界观。虽然知道他的性格会导致他马上将再次踏上旅途，虽然知道伊萨卡并不能给他带来一切，奥德修斯还是义无反顾地一点一点地朝着他的家乡走去。这种精神是霍克海默和阿尔多诺所批判的启蒙理性所不必备的，也是一种对科学理性相反的“魔法社会”的朝圣。

In his History and Class Consciousness, Georg Lukacs attempts to reemphasize Marxism’s Hegelian origin and redeem dialectics from attacks of revisionism. Opposing Kantian metaphysics, which makes an arbitrary difference between thing and thing-in-itself, the dialectic is supposed to be a relative dynamic between opposite ideas; in addition, it is supposed to be praxis, or unified thoughts and action. Consciousness is a dialectical notion: it is supposed to be “practical critical activity” with the task of “changing the world” (78). Class consciousness, in addition, “approaches society from another world and leads from the false path it has followed back to the right one” (78). In order to bring historical movement, the proletariat must organize itself and realize its own class consciousness.

This reading of class consciousness, while recognizing its aim for praxis, nonetheless place it primarily in the realm of thought. Even though upon realization of class consciousness action towards revolution must be on the way, the class consciousness itself does not quite contain action yet. This reading suggests that the realization of class consciousness is the exact moment that the thought is leading towards action; and, by virtue of its transition, class consciousness contains both thoughts and action. That which comes before class consciousness is either false consciousness or political unconsciousness; that which comes after consciousness–well, I think orthodox Marxism calls it revolution.

However, an opposing interpretation challenges this reading. It states that realization of class consciousness is revolution already because the proletariat class has already recognized its condition, and changes are already made in thoughts. To this point I object: where forth is praxis, that which unites thought and action? Defenders of this reading replies that because class consciousness is already defined as “thought and action”, the realization of such fulfills the dialectics of praxis. But isn’t this logic circular? Class consciousness is both thought and action, hence realizing it fulfills both thought and action. This interpretation seems to reduce class consciousness into a mere game of semantics, making it no more than a play of definitions. The condition of the proletariat does not change; perhaps it can imagine its socioeconomic condition changed–but usually we call that “false consciousness”.

If we are to talk about Marxism, I think it would be for the best that we stay within its historical materialist framework. And perhaps our critique of it should come from historical perspective as well. For example: why the proletariat? Reliance on this particular class by today’s standard seems absurd. Even in Marx’s, or perhaps later, in Lukacs’ time, such a class would be unable–too uneducated to understand the meaning of alienation, of fetishism, and of class consciousness–to carry out anything on its own. It is merely a reified object to the Marxist intellectuals and politicians, whom, symbolizing thought, required an outlet for action. What of subject-object relations and praxis? Well, I believe that in Hellenic Athens a group of professionals named sophists often taught their disciples ways of deceiving and taking advantage of others through the art of speech.

When the term “revisionism” first appeared in Eduard Bernstein’s work Evolutionary Socialism, it lacked its latter stigma as any form of deviance to an arbitrarily established “orthodoxy” of Marxism. Had Bernstein lived, he would have rejected with disgust Mao’s calling of Khrushchev “revisionist” and other abuses of his term.

Is Bernstein’s revisionism truly “revisionist” by its later attribution? The answer is clear: Bernstein would disagree with Mao by stating that Khrushchev’s thaw and destalinization was not enough. Only a genuine move away from Communist ultimate goal and violent means of achieving for parliamentary socialism would suffice the burden of the term “revisionist”. Revisionism, in its philosophical grounds, further represents the move away from Hegelian dialectics for Kantianism. Bernstein undermines the theory of value that Marxist creates in Das Kapital. As an associate of Marx and a close friend (and one of the two literary trustee) of Engels, then, Bernstein had truly disowned the original foundation of Marxism.

The historical reception of Bernstein, however, is dim; he was criticized immediately by orthodox Marxists of his time–most famously by Sparticist Rosa Luxemburg, who called him the first of Marxist “opportunists”. His “revisionism” was often mentioned as a label against political enemies while his positive contribution to Marxism to call for self-examination: “the further development and elaboration of the Marxist doctrine must begin with criticism of it” (Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism, 25). His reception outside of Marxism fared no better. Even though European democratic socialist parties in practice followed many of Bernstein’s points, they find Bernstein perhaps too tainted by his associations with Marx and Engels for orthodoxy. Had Bernstein been less practical and more capable of producing a sound theoretical work of his own, perhaps he would have found better receptions.

Of course, one must not forget that in the post-Marxist world, the specter of Marx (and his followers, critiques, friends and enemies) lives. Derrida’s hauntology found its way even into Marx’s prodigal son, Eduard Bernstein. When Bernstein’s spirit was invoked by Xie Tao in his famed article last February in support of Chinese adoption of Democratic Socialism, would it know that through such invocation Luxemburg’s criticism of Bernsteinian “opportunism” was again conjured into existence as well? Perhaps, instead of criticizing Xie Tao’s citation of Bernstein as an anachronism, we can see this act in the light of huantology and accepted our fate that the haunt is long from over.

第一次捧起《读史阅世六十年》是05年冬天的事情了。当时为了应付复旦大学保送生入学考试，拿这本书中的中英庚款考试的题目来模拟一下。考试结束后，大致看了下这位成长于动荡年代的学人的求学之路，感触不深，无非一个留学人士在晚年写本较为学术的个人回忆来八卦一下往日风情。

今年寒假，丁亥岁寒之际，在达慕思书院东亚图书馆，与好友偶遇此书，深感有缘，借出后再次回味。今日此时，苟且为一位史学大师作评述，不自量力之处，望看读者莫笑。我尽量只写我对书的评价，不加入太多个人感情问题，不过此书确实夹杂了我不少感情，同样的冬天，相差无几的温度，一样的文字，一样的迷茫。。。

就此书而言，何炳棣在书的上篇还算客观，仅仅客观回忆了其求学历程，从中学到大学。最为令我欣赏或值得学习的是其学习的计划性：在大学期间，虽然清华经历了战火的纷扰，但作者依旧完成了英国史的自修的计划，读完了吉本的《罗马帝国衰亡史》等著作，同时为以后博士阶段的英史研究打下了良好的基础。而这段时期的清华大学历史系，更可谓是中国最强大的历史系。雷海宗、蒋廷黻、陈寅恪等人云集一堂，又有梅贻琦作为清华校长，保证学术思想自由独到，让当代学人无限向往。

当然，从书中最可取的那些信息莫过于如何做学问了。记得余英时先生曾对一个年轻的学生说过：“做学问最重要的就是敬业！”这句话非常有道理，何炳棣先生的成功也在于其敬业。从大学起就勤于练习，善于考察一手原始资料。在描写国外的下篇中，很明显地可以发现，作者地成功很大程度上仰赖于其良好学术习惯。何炳棣曾经在纽约国会图书馆中文书库中花一整个夏天抄写中国某个地区的地方志中的统计资料，并且反复考证其真实性。同时他还四处游走，寻访各种史料。对于一个历史学者来说，史料的详实和独到是其成功的一大基础。而何炳棣就是这么一位基础坚实的历史学家。

书中如果细细读来，可以发现作者有较为明显的自吹自擂之嫌，但这本书对于我们读者的意义并不在于何炳棣是否谦卑，而在于如何从他大致的一生中觅得今日得生活指导。不论今后从事何种生涯，最为重要的，莫过于基础，而对于基础的培养，往往就需要一种”敬业“了。

The title Metahistory may seem deceptive: I approached the book imagining that its author, Hayden White, is attempting to create another speculative philosophy of history in the lines of Hegel, Spengler, and Toynbee. Instead, White treats patterns of history in a post-structuralist perspective: he analyzes historiographies of prominent historians and philosophers of history in the nineteenth century alike and analyze their work as result of specific tropes and particular aims of these historians and philosophers. Hence, the works of Hegel, Michelet, Ranke, Tocqueville, Burckhardt, Marx, Nietzsche, and Croce are categorized within the four tropes of metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony–with White himself writing in irony. In addition, explanations of historiographical works can be based on emplotment, argument, and ideological implication, roughly correlated to one another in this fashion:

Mode of Employment/ Mode of Argument/ Mode of Ideological Implication
Romantic/ Formist/ Anarchist
Tragic/ Mechanistic/ Radical
Comic/ Organicist/ Conservative
Satirical/ Contextualist/ Liberal

White’s work, then, is meta-historical in the sense that he perceives language as the key, or meta-aspect, beyond all writings of historiography. A poetic and linguistic approach to history, then, is announced to introduce a post-structuralist reading of writers and interpreters of past events.

Hayden White’s work, then, attempts to reject a perception of history that Collingwood sets out in his Idea of History; previous debates on the nature of history is replaced by an array of writers in history characterized by difference in style, while causality is abandoned in place of plurality. However, I am still at this point inclined to subscribe to Collingwood’s view that history is the reenactment of thoughts of historians, who are but imaging the thoughts of his treated subjects. In the Collingwoodian sense, history is kept as a continuation of thought, an idea that man consciously “remembers” and attempts to reach through their own thoughts. In this sense, then, history can be kept true regardless of the format that it is kept; man can interpret the artifacts of the past regardless of its status as a historical account, a part of archive, a chronicle of events, or physical object of the past like a palace, a piece of art, or even a coin. On the other hand, the metahistorical analysis of history is itself limited by language–and especially in the form of written language. Its ability of explanation is limited by the form of historical accounts and therefore cannot be complete.

今日苦读阳明先生《传习录》，读到以下一段，觉得应该与海内外的广大学子们分享一番：

問：「讀書所以調攝此心，不可缺的。但讀之之時，一種科目意思牽引而來，不知同以免此？」先主曰：「只要良知真切，雖做舉榮，不為心累，雖有累，亦易覺克之而已。且如讀書時，良知知得強記之心不是，即克去之，有欲速之心不是，即克去之，有誇多斗靡之心不是，即克去之：如此亦只是終日與聖賢印對，是個純乎天理之心。任他讀書，亦只是調攝此心而已，何累之有？」曰：「雖蒙開示，奈負質庸下，實難免累：竊聞窮通有命，上智之人，恐不屑此不肖為聲利牽纖，甘心為此，徙自苫耳。欲屏棄之，又制於親，不能捨去，奈何？」先生曰：「此事歸辭於親者多矣；其實只是無志。志立得時，良知千事萬事只是一事。讀書作文，安能累人，人自累於得失耳！」因歎曰：「此學不明，不知此處擔擱了幾多英雄漢！」
–
阳明先生一番苦心，劝说大家不要为功名所惑，一定不能忘了“良知”。哪怕一开始是为了考试、为了成功而学，只要能有良知，就能去掉急于求成的心，争强好胜的心，强记死读书的心，和一切公里目的的心，从而印证自己本来即存有之天理之心。虽然我们不需要接受陆王心学“天理”、“良知”、“诚意”和“知行合一”等种种理念，却也可以在这真挚的对话中找到些感触吧！提问人实在是太像我们很多人了（当然也包括鄙人）：他觉得自己资质低下，难得消除自己的负担——不像那些出生好的、天资聪明的人，不屑于功名——必须现实的面对科举考试来赢得功名。他觉得自己无助地受到了父母亲人朋友的期望或“约制”——不管是有形的还是无形的——而无法抛弃功利的想法去真正求学。阳明先生的回答甚有道理：我们不能怪罪于父母亲人朋友，而更应该自省，明白问题出在自己身上，是自己没有没有志向！当志向坚定时，心怀良知，无论做什么都是“一事”：此乃不违本心，为己而学，诚意修身，顺道而行之事。先生叹息，“此学不明，不知此处耽搁了几多英雄好汉！”扪心自问，难道这句话不就是针对吾辈现状的肺腑之言吗？鄙人不才，只希望这段话对广大学子们有些帮助。